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ABSTRACT
Cultivating Creativity in Aerospace Systems Engineering to Manage Complexity
Kenneth Lucas Dodd

In recent decades, complexity in aerospace programs has been increasing, leading
to large budget and schedule overruns. Many of the risks of complex system development
can be attributed to the inadequacy of linear methods when applied to nonlinear domains,
i.e., oversimplification in a program amplifies the amount of risk produced when a system
behaves unexpectedly. Effectively managing complexity involves responding to the
various sources of complexity, whether it appears in the objective behavior of the system
itself or in the subjective behavior of the people developing it. Thus, the engineering of
complex systems requires nonlinear modeling methods of the system as well as nonlinear
processes for developing the system. Much effort tends to be focused on addressing the
objective sources of complexity and less is given to understanding and responding to the
subjective sources of complexity. This present study examines how facilitating creativity
in aerospace system development can serve as a potential strategy for managing
complexity. Creativity is a kind of psychological process that integrates linear and
nonlinear modes of thinking, and therefore systems engineering processes that reflect the
creative process could reduce the risks of complexity. There are three primary results of
this work: a novel application of creativity research to aerospace engineering processes;
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the most comprehensive published review of existing research on creativity in aerospace
known to-date; and the proposal of two new systems engineering methods for facilitating
creativity to manage complexity. These two new methods designed to improve the
Waterfall methodology are as follows: the formation of a Parallel Systems Engineering
group that functions analogously to how linear and nonlinear information are coordinated
in creativity; and a conceptual model wherein aerospace programs are treated as a series of
interdependent creative processes, which can be used to trace the propagation of
complexity through various phases of system development.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

This thesis is a response to both the current and perennial aspects of aerospace
complexity. The research presented here is a thorough examination of the relationship
between complexity, creativity, and aerospace systems engineering in light of historical
trends toward developing increasingly advanced, complex systems. It can function as a
comprehensive guide book for how creativity could be a solution strategy for managing
aerospace complexity, and its methods are ready to be applied and tested in the work
environment.

Much of the literature in complexity theory forwards many poignant examples of
complex system behavior, yet tend to use inconsistent definitions, offer generic
recommendations, and conflate political and scientific discussions about complexity.
Granted, complexity is a complex subject matter. Even so, there is a need for consistent
definitions, specific recommendations, and a scientific discussion of complexity. “We need
a new paradigm for systems engineering. [Former NASA Administrator] Michael Griffin
has suggested that Systems Engineering is a collection of heuristics that lacks a
foundational theory” (Holt et al., 2017). Given recent changes in the aerospace industry,
such a study is warranted. This thesis responds to the problem of complex aerospace system
development in three main ways: (1) a novel application of creativity research to aerospace
1

engineering processes; (2) the most comprehensive published compilation of existing
research on creativity in aerospace known to-date; and (3) the proposal of two new systems
engineering methods for facilitating creativity to manage complexity.

Chapter 2 is a discussion of complexity as it pertains to the aerospace industry.
Complexity is defined and misconceptions are clarified in Section 2.1. Recent evidence of
the increase of complexity in aerospace programs and the subsequent risk will be surveyed
in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, the difficulty of complex systems engineering will be
examined, which will suggest that a paradigmatic change in complexity management
strategy is necessary to improve upon the recent trend of cost and schedule overruns. The
difference between objective and subjective complexity will be briefly looked at in Section
2.4, because it is important to recognize that objective and subjective sources of complexity
call for different solution strategies. This builds up to Chapter 3, where creativity is
discussed as a mechanism for addressing the paradigmatic challenge of complex systems
engineering.

Chapter 3 applies creativity research to the aerospace system development process,
something that is almost entirely unprecedented in the field. Section 3.1 is a literature
review of creativity research, discussing what creativity is in the context of engineering, as
well as clarifying common misconceptions that have import in understanding why fostering
creativity could be used to respond to aerospace engineering complexity. Section 3.2 is a
study of how the creative process consists of an interplay between convergent and
divergent thinking modes and applies these ideas to conceptual design. This directly feeds
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into a discussion in Section 3.3 of how, specifically, creativity addresses complexity.
Creativity is what is called a “tertiary process,” because it integrates linear and nonlinear
thinking. Creativity can bridge linear engineering methods with complex design domains.
In this way, creativity could be used as a mechanism to more appropriately respond to
complexity. Section 3.4 describes the motivational factors that facilitate or hinder creativity
and relates these motivational factors to human behavior in aerospace programs. Section
3.5 first discusses the creative process in general, and then applies this creativity research
to the phases of aerospace development programs. In Section 3.6, the Agile and Waterfall
systems engineering methodologies are discussed and compared as strategies for
facilitating creativity.

Chapter 4 brings together existing research on fostering creativity in aerospace
engineering, as well as engineering as a whole. Various methods for fostering creativity
are described. The methods bear special relevance in searching for how to improve the
historically traditional Waterfall methodology, but are applicable under a variety of
systems engineering strategies. First, there is an overview of the existing literature in
Section 4.1, notably featuring the work of aircraft designer Darold Cummings, who is the
primary forerunner in the topic of creativity in aerospace engineering. Some of his
recommendations for facilitating creativity, which focus on stimulating creative brain
activity, are discussed in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. Other recommendations and findings of his
are brought up at other places throughout this chapter. Section 4.4 surveys engineering
research on the motivational factors of creativity. Section 4.5 briefly compares the effects
of leadership style and systems engineering on the motivational factors of creativity.
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Section 4.6 references studies on creativity in engineering education and workplace
training. Section 4.7 summarizes various methodological tools in aerospace engineering
that can affect creativity: several tools for evaluating creativity, Multidisciplinary
Optimization, and Model-Based Systems Engineering. Section 4.8 introduces Gabora’s
proposed approach for mathematically modeling the creative process. These methods
outline the limited amount of existing research on creativity in aerospace.

Chapter 5 is the culmination of the research in this thesis. In it, I recommend two new
systems engineering methods for facilitating creativity as a way to manage complexity.
The first method is the introduction of a Parallel Systems Engineering group that functions
similarly to how intuition and tertiary processing functions in the mind. The second method
is a conceptual model for how modelling the creative processes in aerospace programs
could make complexity traceable throughout the various phases of a program’s lifecycle.

This thesis represents a comprehensive survey of existing research on how creativity
relates to aerospace engineering as well as a step forward in the field. As mentioned, it can
be used as a guide book for how to manage complexity in aerospace programs, especially
large programs. The implications of the research presented here is ready for application
and testing. This study may serve as a milestone for future research in the topic.

4

Chapter 2
COMPLEXITY

In this chapter, we will examine complexity so as to build an argument for why fostering
creativity in aerospace programs could help in managing complex systems. First, we will
look at a basic definition of complexity based on a literature review of the mainstream
research. Then, we will look at how complexity has been affecting the aerospace industry
in recent times. This is followed by an examination of a paradigmatic challenge of complex
systems engineering. This will be followed by a discussion comparing between objective
and subjective sources of complexity. Chapter 2 serves as background for how and why
fostering creativity could address many of the challenges of complex aerospace system
engineering.

2.1 A Basic Definition of Complexity

First of all, what is complexity? Throughout the literature, there are many competing
definitions of complexity and proposed methods for addressing it. There is even argument
over whether or not it is at all possible to make a general theory of complexity, since doing
so might take the complexity out of complexity (Morin, 2008). It may seem like what is
most definite about complexity is its indefiniteness, and that understanding complexity is
itself a complex undertaking. The fact that complexity is not a well-defined problem does
5

add risk to the process of developing a complex system. Nevertheless, it is possible to find
consensus among researchers and form a definition of complexity adequate for practical
purposes. A broadly accepted view is that complexity is the quality of a system having a
large number of components with tight coupling between them, which results in the system
exhibiting unexpected behaviors (Clearfield & Tilcsik, 2018). In simple terms, a complex
system is one for which “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts” (Mitchell, 2009).

Complexity in this sense is a modern concept, but there is also a long history of
complexity research. A quick glance at the etymology of complexity will shed some light
on the definition used here. Complexity derives from the Latin verb plectere, which refers
to the process of braiding or folding things together (Mitchell, 2009; Morin, 2008). Thus,
a complex system is a system characterized by the intertwining between its parts. The
interrelatedness of a complex system means that the whole system exhibits behavior that
is inextricable from the sum of its components. Just as pulling on a thread can significantly
affect an entire fabric, affecting any one component of a complex system can significantly
affect the whole system. This interrelatedness can also happen over time, such that the
system has the capacity to change itself over time. The properties of a complex system
which emerge as a result of the assembly of components are often called emergent
properties.

An excellent example of a complex system is a natural ecosystem. At Yellowstone
National Park, the resident population of wolves became extinct many decades ago due to
over-hunting. This absence of predation from wolves allowed the elk and deer population
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to grow several times larger than its normal amount. This led to deforestation of aspen
groves near bodies of water, which the deer and elk like to consume. In turn, beavers could
not gather enough building material for their nests and dams, and so they left the
Yellowstone region entirely. Consequently, many species which depended on the ponds
created by beaver dams, like algae, insects, frogs, fish, and waterfowl, also disappeared
from the area. However, in more recent years, the wolves were reintroduced into
Yellowstone, and their population was protected by law. This had a chain reaction on the
food web: the deer and elk population decreased, the aspen groves replenished, the beavers
returned to the park, and numerous species of aquatic organisms and waterfowl returned
along with them (Hannibal, 2012). The nonlinear effects of the presence of wolves on the
Yellowstone ecosystem are emergent properties that exemplify complex system behavior.
The Yellowstone ecosystem is a complex system because the interdependencies between
its many organisms are of great significance to how the entire ecosystem behaves.

An example of an aerospace system that meets the criteria for complexity is the National
Aerospace Plane (NASP) program’s X-30 vehicle design. The X-30’s was intended to be
a single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) flight vehicle, using combined-cycle air-breathing engines
to power the vehicle from subsonic to hypersonic speeds. This meant that the various flight
systems were highly interdependent and sensitive to performance perturbations. The
vehicle would have had a very large number of parts with tight coupling between them.
Not only was the vehicle itself complex, the program behind it was also complex, relying
on thousands of engineers in numerous civilian contractors and branches of the Department

7

of Defense. The complexity of the X-30 system and program led to its eventual demise
(Schweikart, 1998; Heppenheimer, 2007).

It is key to differentiate between what might be termed a colloquial notion of complexity
and the more technical definition used here. Colloquially, complexity is often understood
as the quality of something being especially hard to understand or control. In a technical
setting, the colloquial version of complexity is inadequate, because it has the consequence
of conflating complex systems with large linear systems. A large deterministic system,
which may be hard to understand, is theoretically predictable. By comparison, a complex
system, which is by definition nondeterministic, may also be hard to understand, but it is
theoretically unpredictable. Unlike a large linear system, a complex system does not simply
exhibit integration effects but actually behaves quite differently from predictive models.
Emergent properties are opaque to deterministic prediction, and therefore pose risk to a
program. The risk posed by emergent properties can be called emergent risk (DeTurris &
Palmer, 2018). Although in practice it can be a good idea to try to minimize a program’s
complexity so as to avert unwanted emergent risk, the scope of this research is limited to
the cases where the technological advantages of complexity are preferred to the benefits of
minimizing complexity. Now that a basic definition of complexity has been established,
we will proceed to examine the problem at hand regarding complexity in aerospace today.
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2.2 Emergent Risk in Aerospace Today

On top of typical sources of uncertainty, complex system development programs come
with the added challenges of emergent risk. In recent decades, large aerospace programs
have become increasingly large, advanced, risky, and, consequently, increasingly costly
and time-consuming. This rise in complexity is evidenced by the increase in such things as
the numbers of subsystems, component interfaces, and lines of code (Arena et al., 2008).
The fourth-generation F/A-18 has 15 subsystems, approximately 103 interfaces, and 40%
of its functions managed by software. By comparison, the fifth-generation F-35 has 140
subsystems, 105 interfaces, and 90% of its functions managed by software (DeTurris,
2017). With such an increase in system complexity comes additional program risk.
Numerous large aerospace programs have experienced major delays and schedule runovers
due to risks associated with complexity. As mentioned, the NASP program sought to
produce an air-breathing, hypersonic vehicle. Although the program enlisted NASA,
DARPA, the Air Force, the Navy, the SDIO, Rockwell, McDonnell Douglas, General
Dynamics, Rocketdyne, and Pratt & Whitney and at its peak had an annual budget of $320million, the program ran for about ten years, completing only 17 out of 32 major technical
milestones before it was cancelled (Schweikart, 1998; Heppenheimer, 2007). In the case
of the Boeing 787, many technical and organizational risks were taken without prior
experience of such risks. Boeing delegated responsibility for development risks across their
supply chain, but this amounted to a 40-month delay and a cost overrun of about $10billion (Zhao, 2016). The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) development has been delayed by
nearly a decade and gone over budget by roughly $20-billion (GAO, 2018), due to the
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enormous challenges of designing it for multiple design environments with differing
technology requirements (Sprenger, 2013). The January 2020 GAO report states that the
James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) “is one of NASA’s most complex projects and top
priorities. Problems discovered during integration and testing caused multiple delays that
led NASA to replan the project in June 2018… The project’s costs have increased by 95
percent and its launch date has been delayed by over 6.5 years since its cost and schedule
baselines were established in 2009.” The JWST has more than 300 single-point failure
modes (GAO, 2020).

Similar problems have also been occurring outside the aerospace industry, with many
technical fields recognizing the immense challenge of developing and maintaining large
systems, and subsequently admitting the need for a thorough reframing of problem-solving
strategies (Mak & Clarkson, 2017). To name a few, these fields include the supervision of
large cybersecurity frameworks, global banking networks, metropolitan power grids, and
nuclear powerplants. A hacker can penetrate a large cybersecurity framework more easily
than a small one, making them more unsafe. The ripples of fraudulent banking activity or
economic collapse can propagate much more quickly in a global, internet-based banking
network than a series of independent, disconnected economies. Advanced power grids in
metropolitan areas have more points that can set up cascading feedback in blackouts, the
downed powerline in 2003 affecting over 55 million in the Northeast being a noteworthy
example (Zolli & Healy, 2012). Nuclear powerplants can approach meltdown due to only
a handful of minor glitches, like the Three Mile Island event in 1979 (Clearfield & Tilcsik,
2018). These system-level failure phenomena were all unexpected or overlooked during
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early phases of development – they were, functionally, unknown unknowns, originating
from system complexity.

Over the last century, the maturation of aircraft and spacecraft design involved a gradual
increase in complexity. However, in recent decades, the development of advanced digital
systems has allowed a sudden spike in the number of interconnections within systems and
systems of development (Becz et al., 2010). This brought with it an amplification in the
number of unknown unknowns (Arena et al., 2008). Figure 1 shows how as the complexity
of automobiles, integrated circuits, and aerospace vehicles has increased, the duration of
design, integration, and testing has levelled off for the automobile and integrated circuit
markets but has continued to increase for aerospace vehicles (Eremenko, 2010). To meet
the rise in complexity, there should be a response in terms of management and systems
engineering strategies. What would this look like?
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Figure 1. Development time compared against system complexity in aerospace systems
(violet), automobiles (green), and integrated circuits (red). (Eremenko, 2010)

Complex systems offer the advantage of added capabilities and the disadvantage of
added risk. Systems like the F-22 Raptor, which rely on advanced technology to execute
their functions, are highly expensive to produce, operate, and maintain. Only 188 of 648
units were produced, their individual cost having raised from $149 million to $412 million
and the program cost from $12.6 billion to $26.3 billion. Moreover, the advanced
technologies onboard are expected to become inferior or obsolete within one or two
decades of its entrance into service (Vartabedian & Hennigan, 2013). Even though the
12

vehicles were functional, was it a worthwhile program? What does its cancellation say
about large, complex aerospace programs relying on advanced technology? Some of the
most effective and lasting aircraft systems in history, like the B-52, the C-130, the F/A-18,
and the 737, have enduring longevity precisely because they were not particularly complex
designs: they were simple enough to be adapted to new uses and robust enough to be
operated and maintained for decades. Even complex aerospace programs that were
arguably successful, like the SR-71, the Saturn V, and the B-2, were extremely costly and
could not be used in quite so versatile a manner as other, simpler systems. With the highly
sophisticated technology currently available to designers, should aerospace systems be
developed for the advantages of complexity even if that means there is added potential for
major unexpected risks?

Complexity is a feature of modern technology, though the risks it poses are closely
related to how well complex systems are managed. Unknown unknowns characterize
today’s cultural backdrop to engineering: designs have a rapidly increasing number of
interconnections and an accelerating ability to communicate around the world (Meadows,
2008). How will aerospace engineering adapt to the changing world? In recent news, the
JPO program is now moving F-35 data into an Agile software development environment
(Hudson, 2020). Another example is the sixth-generation fighter jet. The military is
approaching the problem of a fighter jet from a different angle for the sixth-generation
fighter. Rather than developing one platform with a long maintenance cycle, the program
is being called “Penetrating Counter Air,” and may involve short-run production of
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multiple systems that perform different tasks with a short operational life (DiMascio et al.,
2020). Complexity is already producing responses in the aerospace industry.

Nevertheless, it could be argued that many complex aerospace programs have
experienced budget and schedule overruns not because of system complexity but primarily
because of poor planning and management. Furthermore, the development of large,
complex systems tends to lead to enormous, complex programs. In this way, it can be hard
to distinguish between the complexity of a system and the complexity of a program, making
it difficult to identify where emergent risk originates and where it can be mitigated. Can
complexity and its risk be attributed to excessive ambition and insufficient prudence? The
emergent risks inherent in designing a complex system can easily balloon into nightmarish
difficulty. Yet, complex systems can be alluring to develop because they appear to have
the potential of becoming extremely sophisticated and simultaneously perform many
valuable functions. In Section 2.3, we will look at why complexity poses such a risk for
systems engineering and what should be done about it.

2.3 Complexity Poses a Paradigmatic Challenge for System Engineering

There is a major paradigmatic challenge for complex systems engineering: effective
systems engineering depends on well-defined requirements and predictions, but complex
systems are unpredictable. What can be done to reduce the impact of unpredicted events?

14

2.3.1 The Function of Systems Engineering

The discipline of systems engineering evolved as a response to large, advanced projects
requiring coordination between many diverse teams (Johnson, 2006). In essence, its role is
to coordinate the various roles within an engineering program. Systems engineers
coordinate high-level program goals, detailed work packages, and everything in between,
monitoring the various sources of risks and the program’s process. Systems engineering
serves as the linkage between the working-level engineers and those who oversee the
program goals, and, as such, it exists to make sure clear communication and coordination
of activities occurs between the program management, technical leads, design sub-teams,
users, and stakeholders. Systems engineering acts as a hub amid the technical disciplines
and as a bridge between the technical and business sides of a program. Systems engineers
do not by themselves accomplishes these tasks, as many of their duties are shared with
organization managers (Bay et al., 2009; Davis & O’Connor, 2005; Drake, 2018-19;
Hirshorn, 2006; Parker, 2011). Effectively, systems engineering coordinates the creative
activities of the entire engineering process.

2.3.2 The Challenge of Complex Systems Engineering

Essentially, the problem at hand boils down to a mismatch between the nature of
engineering methods and the nature of complex systems. One of the founders of modern
cybernetics, William Ashby, formulated a rule about how to control a system. Ashby’s
Law of Requisite Variety states that a control system has control over its controlled system
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insofar as it has access to a greater variety of states (Ashby, 1956). As an example, the Law
of Requisite Variety would say that a pilot has control over their aircraft insofar as they
can respond to a greater variety of flight conditions than they experience during flight. This
concept can be applied to systems engineering. Systems engineering methods have control
over their system insofar as they can address a greater variety of system behaviors than the
system will exhibit. In the case of engineering complex systems, there is an unavoidable
shortfall toward what can be known a priori about the system because the system has
emergent properties, which are significantly different from the linear sum of its component
properties and therefore are inordinately difficult to predict. In other words, the integration
and environmental effects of a complex system are beyond the scope of conventional
predictive methods. This is a lack of requisite variety between the engineering processes
and the complex system. It means that the system engineers will more or less experience a
lack of control over their system. To obtain control in a complex program, the engineering
methods need to be able to address a greater variety of states than the complex system can
exhibit. Although increasing prediction capabilities and planning detail might seem like
appropriate responses, in the case of complex systems engineering, this approach misses
the mark as to where the lack of control is located. Complex systems are by definition
unpredictable and nondeterministic, and so increasing fidelity of engineering processes,
protocols, and predictions does not fundamentally gain control over the source of emergent
risk. To be more effective in managing complexity, systems engineers should adopt a
different solution strategy.

16

2.3.3 The Cynefin Framework

Snowden and Boone’s Cynefin Framework (pronounced ku-nev-in) addresses this
paradigmatic challenge by classifying linear and nonlinear systems according to their
degree of determinability and recommending appropriate courses of action for managing
those systems (Snowden & Boone, 2007; Holt et al., 2017). There are five system domains:
simple, complicated, complex, chaotic, and disordered. Simple and complicated systems
are linear, whereas complex and chaotic systems are nonlinear. Disordered systems are
simply those which have not yet been categorized into one of these four domains. Simple
systems are in the linear domain of “known knowns.” They can be practically understood
in their entirety, allowing for full deterministic prediction. Simple systems call for the
categorizing of a problem into an already known course of action. Managing a simple
system involves a sequence of sensing, categorizing, responding. Data is taken of the
system, it is categorized into a known course of action, and then direct action is taken.
Complicated systems are in the linear domain of “known unknowns.” They are linear and
deterministic in nature, and have many more elements involved than simple systems, and
therefore require more skill and understanding to operate. Multiple correct though not
immediately obvious solution approaches exist, and different modeling schemes can all be
valid. Complicated systems can be effectively managed by a priori knowledge, but doing
so requires careful analysis in addition to the implementation of legacy knowledge. For
example, repairing a car or operating a private single-engine airplane under normal
operational conditions are complicated tasks. Cynefin recommends that complicated
systems are managed with a sequence of sensing, analyzing, and responding. Empirical
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data is sensed from the system, that information is analyzed methodically, and then a
response is implemented.

In the nonlinear domain, the possibility for deterministic models and solution methods
starts to break down. A complex system, under the Cynefin Framework, is characterized
by emergent properties, which are often called “unknown unknowns.” Addressing a
complex system is more indirect. Nonlinear systems cannot be predicted deterministically,
and therefore empirical data has to be taken into account before the system can be
potentially understood and effectively controlled. When there is emergent behavior, it is
difficult and even sometimes counterproductive to formulate a priori rules for the system.
Interpretations tend to take the form of empirical studies and loose inferences from the a
posteriori data collected. There is a greater emphasis on a posteriori empirical data in
managing a complex system than there is for linear systems. The central role of uncertainty
in complex systems means that managing complexity requires addressing both technical
and nontechnical factors. This will be discussed more thoroughly in Section 2.4. For now,
take note that although complex systems cannot be predicted, they can be studied and
influenced. Cynefin recommends that the appropriate conduct of leadership in complex
domains is not a command-and-control approach or the avoidance of failure at all costs,
but the establishing of an inquisitive, creative, open-ended workplace environment.
Complex problems should be examined with creativity, patience, open-mindedness, and a
toleration of risk in order to first learn about the system before formalizing various means
to manage it (Snowden & Boone, 2007). Cynefin teaches that complex systems should be
managed in a sequence of probing, sensing, responding. First, information is gathered
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about the system from various points of view through an open-ended, intuitive approach.
Next, information is contextualized and related to other areas of information as observable
trends begin to appear. Then, responses are made with attention to what is known and what
is uncertain.

Chaotic systems are nonlinear systems that are so dynamic and unpredictable that there
has to be direct intervention into the system to obtain any knowledge about it. Outside of
Cynefin, “chaos” is often used in reference to systems with erratic behavior, like turbulence
or ripple-effects. In Cynefin, that kind of chaotic behavior is classified under complexity
since it is more moderate than something like an emergency. Cynefin’s chaos is extreme
to the point where action must precede understanding. The recommended management
sequence is action, sensing, responding. Acting provides a means of obtaining data that can
be responded to. Chaotic systems in this context are not under consideration in this thesis.

Cynefin accords with Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety. For each kind of problem
domain, there is a method with requisite variety for it. A simple system can be managed
simply. A complicated system calls for orderly management strategies. A complex system
requires nuanced management strategies. A chaotic system should be responded to swiftly
and decisively. The problem-solving sequences Cynefin recommends are commensurate
with their problem domain. This brings us to a key insight in this thesis. Increasing
prediction capabilities and methodological detail is not an appropriate management
strategy for complex systems because doing so does not get rid of emergent properties.
Cynefin’s research suggests that obtaining requisite variety over a complex aerospace
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system does not require abandoning prediction and planning but moreover involves
adopting nonlinear systems engineering processes to complement the more linear aspects
of a program. Complex systems are not inherently unmanageable but rather require a
management strategy that is appropriate for complexity.

These are ideas well-supported by many researchers and leaders in the field of systems
engineering. Former NASA Administrator, Michael Griffin, notes that engineers for the
last fifty years have “repeatedly failed to prevent catastrophes along the boundaries or
interfaces between elements, [which are] often due to uncontrolled, unanticipated and
unwanted interactions between elements, in many cases between elements thought to be
entirely separate.” (Griffin, 2010). Instead, he argues, engineers have kept trying to fix the
problem by fixing the process. For Griffin, increasing levels of procedural fidelity is not
where the root solution resides. “We need to rise above process, to examine the technical,
cultural, and political mix that is ‘system engineering’, and to examine the education and
training we are providing to those who would practice this discipline.” This claim was
echoed forty years earlier by NASA Administrator, Robert Frosch, “We have lost sight of
the fact that engineering is an art, not a technique; technique is a tool.” (Griffin, 2010). A
2015 INCOSE white paper titled, “A Complexity Primer for Systems Engineers,” reports:
“Throughout its history, systems engineering has been the primary method for
engineering in the face of complexity. As the complexity of systems and their
contexts has grown, systems engineering methods and tools have increasingly
fallen short of what is needed in the face of this reality. A common approach
has been to seek clever ways to simplify, or reduce, the subjective complexity
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so that the problem and the system are understandable. Scientific advances
have, in fact, often come from elegant simplifications that model the important
variables or forces that dominate behavior. However, this is not always possible
– complexity often cannot be simplified away without losing the essence of the
problem or possible solutions. Further, this simplification leads to an inability
on the part of the solution to be able to engage with the complexity that remains
despite our preference to assume it away.” (Sheard et al., 2015).
Holt et al. state,
“A new paradigm is needed for systems engineering to account for the
unpredictable nature of complexity. Standard systems engineering techniques used
to create large modern products have resulted in an exponential growth in time and
development cost due to complexity. Simply adding layers of modification to the
existing paradigm will not work because complex problems today cannot be solved
using deterministic or stochastic methods. As evidenced by the growth of integrated
hardware and software for large aerospace systems, standard systems engineering
is not obsolete, but it will not work for everything anymore.” (Holt et al., 2017)
Foster, Kay, and Roe write in “Teaching Complexity and Systems Thinking to Engineers”
that:
“The notions of systems and complexity were developed as a response to
dissatisfaction with the science that dominated in the early 1900s. In the systems
literature such science is commonly referred to as ‘Newtonian.’ Reflecting this
description the philosophical underpinnings of Newtonian science are seen as
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including linearity, predictability, control, and the attainability of perfect
knowledge.” (Foster et al., 2001)
There is a strong case that much of the emergent risk observed in the recent decades of
aerospace is a result of relying exclusively on linear processes in nonlinear domains. This
is not to say that formally organized systems engineering methods are inherently opposed
to managing complexity. It is to say that to effectively manage complex system
development, there needs to be a management strategy that reduces the impact of
unpredicted events.

2.4 Objective and Subjective Complexity

Engineering is performed by people, for people, and therefore there are many subjective
factors in engineering programs that deserve systematic attention (McGowan et al., 2013).
Engineering is not limited, strictly speaking, to the technical processes of design and
development, but also encompasses a diversity of roles, disciplines, processes,
perspectives, and cultural forms related to technological system development. Many of
these subjective elements are latent in the industry as customs, such as: organizational
leadership styles and hierarchies; program planning methods and tools; traditions of
standards, procedures, protocols, documentation, assumptions, design methodologies,
legacy knowledge, and empirical models; professional organizations and governmental
bodies; language and broader cultural values; and engineering education paradigms. These
customs evolved through many iterations of failures and successes of earlier programs and
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are therefore apt for addressing many aspects of engineering. These subjective aspects of
engineering are important for complex system development.

Sillitto describes subjective complexity as the “inability of a human mind to grasp the
whole of a complex problem and predict the outcome,” and objective complexity as
“technical or system characteristics that lead to the subjective complexity or difficulty”
(Sheard et al., 2015). Sillitto’s objective and subjective complexity are rather light and
informal, yet they were presented in 2015 by leading members of the International Council
on Systems Engineering (INCOSE). There is a lot of research to be done on defining
complexity for systems engineering. For the sake of the present discussion, it is relevant to
differentiate between objective and subjective complexity to show that there need to be
management strategies that address complexity in human behavior and not merely
technical details.

Objective complexity is the main definition of complexity given earlier: the quality of
a system exhibiting emergent properties due to having many components with tight
coupling between them. Objective complexity refers to the organization of a complex
system. It can apply to everything from the specific hierarchy of each element in the system
to the various feedback mechanisms which occur between those elements under differing
circumstances. As mentioned, the X-30 design was objectively complex. The X-30
program was also subjectively complex, since it involved thousands of engineers working
in tightly interrelated ways. The thousands of engineers are the many components to the
program. The tight coupling comes from the program having thirty-eight advanced
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technical milestones to reach, which made the developers significantly dependent on each
other’s work. The objective complexity of the program produces subjective complexity.
The mishmash of people working on NASP led to many emergent properties, such as the
confusion over what exactly the program was attempting to develop as well as the discord
in work expectations between the many players involved. Engineering programs involve
people, and human behavior is complex, since people have many emergent properties in
their individual and group behavior (Mitchell, 2009; Gleick, 2008; Clearfield & Tilcsik,
2018). This is subjective complexity.

Objective and subjective complexity come from different sources and therefore should
be handled differently. Objective complexity can arise from factors like tightly coupled
subsystems, large digital networks, nonlinear operational environments, integration effects,
coupled failure modes, real-world factors, unplanned off-design conditions, and unforeseen
stakeholders. Subjective complexity can arise from factors like advanced technology,
excess uncertainty, miscommunication, scope creep, poor documentation, hasty planning
and coordination, insufficient or late testing, concurrent technology development, tension
between user needs or requirements, inadequate design tools and processes, and decisionmaking biases. In aerospace programs, complexity tends to correlate with such things as
advanced technology development, excess ambition and inexperience, multiple flight
regimes, multirole aircraft, high maneuverability, high speed, high altitudes, stealth, many
communication pathways, and low redundancy. Responses to complexity should be
grounded in a rigorous understanding of sources of complexity in general, which highlights
features that would otherwise remain subtle or hidden. Appropriate response strategies

24

would emphasize the respective origins of complexity. Objective complexity calls for
attention to the system at hand. Subjective complexity calls for attention to the conditions
of knowledge, both assumed in models and embedded in design methodologies.
Responding to objective complexity is perhaps a more straightforward task than responding
to subjective complexity, since the challenge of objective complexity comes from the
objective system. Subjective complexity calls for taking into account the criteria embedded
in knowledge about a system.

There can also be a subjective complexity that arises from an objectively complex
system. This is the main kind of complexity that poses the paradigmatic problem of
complex systems engineering. To address the subjective complexity of designing an
objectively complex system, it is important to integrate nonlinear thinking into systems
engineering strategies. Nonlinear thinking and behavior are better equipped for addressing
objective complexity than more linear thinking and behavior because they provide a
mechanism for obtaining requisite variety. A complex process can access similar varieties
of states as a complex system, which is essentially what Cynefin teaches. This brings us to
where creativity becomes important in complex systems engineering: as a mechanism for
addressing the subjective complexity of developing objectively complex systems.
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Chapter 3
CREATIVITY

At first glance, creativity may seem like a far-removed topic from aerospace
engineering. On the contrary, engineering is fundamentally a kind of creative activity.
Therefore, looking into how creativity works can help improve systems engineering
methods. Moreover, creativity research addresses and offers resolutions to the
paradigmatic problem of complex systems engineering. As such, fostering creativity in
aerospace systems engineering could be used as a complexity management strategy. In this
chapter, we will explore the relationship between creativity and aerospace engineering. In
Section 3.1, a definition of creativity is formalized for the context of aerospace engineering
so as to clear up misconceptions and set the stage for the subsequent discussion. In Section
3.2, we will look at how creativity in general brings together reasoning and intuition
through convergent and divergent thinking, with some basic application to aerospace
programs. In Section 3.3, we will more thoroughly examine why creativity is aptly suited
for addressing the problem of complexity in aerospace. Section 3.4 pertains to the
motivational factors in creativity in the context of aerospace. Section 3.5 applies research
about the stages of the creative process to aerospace programs. Section 3.6 compares two
systems engineering paradigms for facilitating creativity: first the paradigm of Agile,
which formally loosens processes, secondly the paradigm of Waterfall, which aims at
formalizing effective processes. This will serve as conceptual background for Chapters 4,
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which summarizes existing strategies for facilitating creativity, and for Chapter 5, which
recommends new strategies for facilitating creativity.

3.1 Defining Creativity for Engineering

To make sense of how engineering is a creative process, we will first form a definition
of creativity that makes sense for engineering. It is a common misconception that creativity
is novelty produced by informal, artistic means. As David Cropley, a central figure in the
research of engineering creativity, writes, “…creativity is often associated with lack of
rigor, impulsive behavior, free expression of ideas without regard to quality, and similar
‘soft’ factors” (Cropley, 2015). On the contrary, the evidence and consensus among
researchers is that novelty makes up only one half of creativity, the other half being
practical skill. Creativity is not mere novelty but instead combines novelty with practical
skill. This gives us the definition that will be used here: creativity is the capability to solve
problems in novel and useful ways (Russ, 1993; Amabile, 1996; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996;
Cropley, 2015). It is not merely the ability to produce novelties, which is inventiveness, nor
is it merely the ability to make useful products, which is technical skill (Csikszentmihalyi,
1996; Lehrer, 2012). Being a creative engineer requires both a great deal of knowledge and
enough cleverness to implement that knowledge well. This is clearly evidenced in famous
engineers of history, like Nikola Tesla, the Wright brothers, Kelly Johnson, Jack Northrop,
and Werner von Braun. They are not remembered for being either visionary or practical:
they are remembered for the transformative impacts their systems left on society
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). These individuals were not only deeply knowledgeable about
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their fields, they also could think outside-the-box to develop exceptionally effective
solutions to the problems of their times. The fact that they were able to engineer creative
technology meant that they had to be able to combine inventiveness with technical skill.

Undergirding every creative act, big or small, is this combination of novelty and
technical skill. This is the broad consensus among creativity researchers. “Creativity means
a person’s capacity to produce new or original ideas, insights, restructuring, inventions, or
artistic objects, which are accepted by experts as being of scientific, aesthetic, social, or
technological value” (Vernon, 1989). “A product or response is creative to the extent that
appropriate observers agree it is creative… [whenever it is] novel and appropriate, useful,
correct or valuable…to the task at hand” (Amabile, 1996). “A product is creative if old
facts are integrated in new ways, new relationships emerge from old ideas, or there is a
new configuration. Novelty, however, is not a sufficient [criterion]” (Russ, 1993).
Creativity does not belong to the arts and humanities any more or less than it belongs to
the STEM fields (Cropley, 2006; Lehrer, 2012; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996).

“Creativity is really a form of problem solving” (Guilford, 1968; Russ, 1993), and it is
a central aspect of engineering. Engineering is, fundamentally, the practice of creating
technological systems that satisfy a set of user needs, and every engineer uses some amount
of creativity in their work (Cropley, 2015; Cropley, 2020). Engineers can be creative as
individuals or as teams, and many attributes of individual creativity can be effectively
scaled up to group creativity and vice versa (Cropley, 2020). Creativity can be a personality
trait or a learned quality, and it can be facilitated or hindered by environmental factors,
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culture, and team dynamics (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). Creativity can also be ascribed to
the object or idea created, as in when something is judged to be creative. So, creativity is
both a process of developing a system and an attribute that a system can have (Russ, 1993).
Here, we will be focusing on the creative process of engineering rather than creative
products or creative personalities. It is the creative process that has the most relevance for
aerospace systems engineering.

Engineering is a kind of creative activity, and therefore it is important for engineering
processes to facilitate creativity. As mentioned, there is a common misunderstanding that
creativity is the same as novelty. Once this misunderstanding is removed, it becomes more
apparent that engineering is, ipso facto, a creative process. Engineers create things, and
therefore engineering is a creative process. This observation opens up a new way of
addressing problems in engineering methods. Problems in engineering can be addressed as
obstacles in the creative processes of engineering. On its own, this is a good enough reason
to study the relationship between creativity research and aerospace systems engineering.
Yet, there is an even better reason for doing so, which will be espoused in Sections 3.2 and
3.3. Before proceeding to discuss this and how creative behavior works, there are additional
clarifications which are useful to make. First, we will consider the generalized nature of
creativity and its applicability to systems engineering. Then, we will address why
“creativity” was selected as the present research topic rather than another similar topic such
as “design” or “innovation.”
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In stating that engineering is basically a kind of creativity, this is not to reduce
sophisticated engineering tasks to simple, generic behaviors. Although creative processes
can appear in many forms – e.g., painting, architecture, city planning – creative processes
never happen in a generic way, i.e., creativity always happens in a specific context. There
is a longstanding debate over whether or not there are consistencies in cognition and
behavior across different fields of creativity (Cropley, 2020). For instance, do painting and
engineering involve similar thoughts and behaviors? Without settling the debate, it is
widely agreed that creativity has aspects which are unique to a specific field and aspects
which are generalizable. Insofar as creativity can be generalized, its generic aspects can be
abstracted and applied to specific contexts. Yet the generalized creative process does not
include all aspects of a specific field. For example, painting and architecture are creative
activities even though learning about creativity does not teach one how to paint or design
buildings. Learning about creativity does, however, improve one’s ability to apply
technical knowledge about painting and architecture. Likewise, creativity has relevance to
engineering as a whole. Even though creativity research does not contain the specific,
technical aspects of engineering, comparing the general processes of engineering against
the general processes of creativity provides a useful means for evaluating and improving
the quality of engineering methodologies. Those aspects of engineering processes which
are consistent across programs, such as methodologies and modeling platforms, are general
in nature, and can be compared to the creative process more directly than activities which
are specific to a program. Systems engineering is a generalized discipline, so it can be
compared against general principles of creativity.
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There are numerous words similar to “create” that are sometimes used interchangeably,
such as “design,” “develop,” “produce,” “make,” “invent,” and “innovate.” In this thesis,
these words are used selectively even though in most practical circumstances it is not
necessary to do so. It is worth giving a brief overview as to why “creativity” was selected
as the main topic rather than “design” or “development.” Some might argue that “create”
is just a synonym for “design” or “develop,” and therefore studying engineering creativity
is a redundant reframing of design science. This viewpoint misunderstands the motivations
and implications of engineering creativity. The study of engineering creativity looks at the
subjective processes involved in the act of making systems, from a multidisciplinary
perspective and often with a heavy reliance on psychological research.

Similarly, “creativity” is studied here rather than “invention” or “innovation” because
the paradigmatic challenge of complexity in systems engineering is more a problem of
cognitive dissonance than a lack of technical capabilities (“Invent;” Cropley 2015;
Verganti 2008; Verganti & Oberg 2013; Cropley 2015; Burton et al., 2011). The ultimate
goal of fostering creativity, as presented here, is not the invention of unique and innovative
systems but the potential for obtaining a cognitive edge on complexity. Creativity
emphasizes subjective elements more than other words with a meaning close to that of
“create,” even though in practice it is not strictly necessary to be precise about words
related to “create.”

Now that a definition of creativity has been formed and some common misconceptions
have been clarified, we will proceed to look at how the creative process is composed of
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convergent and divergent thinking. This will set the stage for understanding how creativity
is a viable solution strategy for managing aerospace complexity.

3.2 Creative Behavior Consists of Convergent and Divergent Thinking

The creative process involves an interplay between two processes called convergent
thinking and divergent thinking, and for this reason facilitating creativity is a potentially
viable strategy for addressing the paradigmatic problem of complexity in aerospace
systems engineering. This section describes and compares convergent and divergent
thinking in a general context and in the context of aerospace system development; several
misconceptions about the creative process are addressed; and an introductory explanation
is given for how and why creativity research applies to complexity in aerospace programs,
which is expanded upon in Section 3.3.

Convergent thinking refers to the more organizational side of creativity: an analytical,
logic-oriented, conceptual state of critical reasoning with “the ability to find a single,
correct solution” (Cropley, 2020). Divergent thinking refers to a more intuitive, fluid,
dynamic state of free-association, broad scanning, and idea-generation, “the ability to ride
the associative currents” (Wallach, 1970). Divergent thinking is related to “transformation
abilities,” which includes thinking outside the box, being cognitively flexible, and using
multiple paradigms (Russ, 1993). As mentioned, convergent thinking tends to be reductive
and focused and divergent thinking tends to be holistic and defocused. Convergent thinking
tends toward rational organization, whereas divergent thinking tends toward intuitive
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relationships. This duality maps onto the two-pronged definition of creativity: the
usefulness of creative products comes from convergent processes and the novelty of
creative products comes from divergent processes (Levi, 2017). Convergent states are more
conceptual and linear in nature, whereas divergent states are more intuitive and nonlinear
(Russ, 1993; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). Note that “conceptual thinking” is organized by
logical reasoning, whereas “affective thinking” is organized by feelings (Russ, 1993).
Affect is important in making possible associative leaps of meaning, such as those involved
in humor, figurative language, and idea-generation. Studies have shown that access to
affective, intuitive states may facilitate the creative insight process (Metcalfe, 1986). It is
thought that being more in tune with affective states entails being more in tune with nonconscious intuited patterns and, subsequently, the mental processes behind the flash of
insight (Russ, 1993). Therefore, sensitivity to affect is closely related to the ability to be
creative. To be closed to affect-laden thoughts is to be closed to creative processes. For the
purposes here, it will be helpful to consider affect, insight, and intuition as linked together.
When one of these terms is referred to in this present work, it is correct to think of the
others as well. This also follows from alternative theories of neuropsychology (Taylor,
2009).

There is some evidence that convergent and divergent thinking are delegated in part to
different hemispheres of the brain. In convergent thinking, the left hemisphere is more
active than the right hemisphere, whereas in divergent thinking, the right hemisphere is
more active. However, in both convergent and divergent thinking, the left and right
hemispheres are both active, only varying in degree (Carlsson et al, 2000). In the context
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of this present work, observations about the neurophysiology of creativity are by no means
critically important. Nevertheless, it is simply worth mentioning that neurophysiological
research shows that creativity involves coordination between diverse brain activities. Just
as creativity is not novelty or technical skill but rather their combination, creativity is also
not merely a divergent behavior or a convergent behavior but both in coordination. This
characteristic of creativity integrating different kinds of thinking plays an important role in
this thesis that will be elaborated on later.

In the creativity research literature, these processes are usually referred to as convergent
and divergent “thinking” so as to discuss them in terms of cognitive states. However, these
processes do not always happen as an internal state but can appear as an outward behavioral
pattern, so they can also be called “processes” rather than “thinking.” It makes little
difference in this context, and so “processing” and “thinking” will be used interchangeably.
Creativity depends on the effective interplay between these convergent and divergent
thinking states (Russ, 1993; Levi, 2017).

Recent empirical studies show that these two sides of the creative process are not
mutually exclusive cognitive states. Convergent thinking is not exclusively conceptual and
linear, nor is divergent thinking exclusively intuitive and nonlinear (Gabora, 2017). Rather,
it is more accurate to understand the difference between convergent and divergent thinking
as a narrowing or widening of focus between specific or general contexts. Convergent
thinking is creative thinking with a tendency to specify thoughts to one context; divergent
thinking is creative thinking with a tendency to generalize thoughts to an open-ended
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context. The ability to shift between these different contexts can be called contextual focus
(Gabora, 2017). Creativity is contextual focus effectively applied to the forms and
functions of systems. Contextual focus can also be interpreted as the capacity for systems
thinking. Thus, creativity can be understood as a kind of systems thinking applied to the
development of useful and novel systems.

The linear nature of convergent thinking and the nonlinear nature of divergent thinking
can be attributed to the cognitive faculties most active in either state. Reasoning focuses
on specifying information and organizing it logically, whereas intuition focuses on relating
information and finding general patterns. In this way, convergent thinking is relatively
more linear than divergent thinking, whereas divergent thinking is relatively more
nonlinear than convergent thinking. Even though neither process is entirely linear or
nonlinear, it is still appropriate and useful to think about convergent thinking as linear and
divergent thinking as nonlinear when understood in this moderate sense.

Furthermore, it follows that the dichotomy between convergent and divergent thinking
is not a difference between orderly and disorderly thinking. Both convergent and divergent
thinking are focused, but in different ways. Convergent thinking focuses on specifying and
organizing information, whereas divergent thinking focuses on making associations
between diverse fields of information. This can be described in terms of conceptual design.
Broadly exploring potential design spaces in a nonlinear way is divergent thinking. It may
appear unfocused and disorderly even though it is purposeful and useful for the whole
design process. Divergent thinking focuses on an open-ended problem domain. In this way,
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divergent thinking is orderly even though its nonlinear appearance can make it look
unfocused and disorderly. On the other hand, focusing on a specific trade space is
convergent thinking. Doing so may appear exclusively linear, analytical, and without
affect. Yet, within the boundaries of the trade space there is broad scanning and associative
thinking, such as in the many critical questions that are posed for evaluating a design’s
feasibility or compliance to requirements. Convergent thinking focuses on a well-defined
problem domain and makes associations within it. In this way, convergent thinking is not
diametrically opposed to divergent thinking. On the whole, convergent and divergent
thinking are closely interrelated in creativity, which has the significant conclusion that
linear and nonlinear thinking are closely interrelated as well, a point which is the topic of
Section 3.3.

These findings contradict what has been called the Blind Variation Selective Retention
(BVSR) theory of creativity. The BVSR model holds that divergent thinking is a
probabilistic process of trial-and-error, where new ideas are generated through random
perturbations of a mental state space. Although it has an obscure title, the BVSR model fits
with the common misunderstanding of creativity mentioned earlier. Many people believe
that being creative means randomly generating novel ideas without practical focus. In
contrast, the more recently formulated Honing Theory (HT) of creativity builds on the
aforementioned research. HT posits that creativity is a process of contextual focus
motivated to hone in on mitigating what can be called “psychological entropy.”
Psychological entropy is an uncertainty which produces a sense of anxiety, dissonance,
boredom, curiosity, or awareness of a problem. In the case of design programs,
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psychological entropy originates in the user needs. The entire design process is motivated
by the user needs and functions as an effort to resolve them. This concept will come back
into play in Section 5.2.

For the present discussion, there are some implications of HT that are important. HT
presents empirical studies with strong evidence that divergent thinking is better modeled
as a chaotic process than random. This research means there is a tangible exchange of linear
and nonlinear information in creativity (Gabora, 2017; Sabelli & Abouzeid, 2003;
Guastello, 2002), which has many significant implications. For one, creative processes
could be modeled mathematically. Moreover, it is relevant to the research presented here
as a justification: creativity bridges linear and nonlinear information, and therefore
creativity could be used as a mechanism to better account for emergent properties, the
unknown unknowns of complex systems. There are two primary ways this finding is
applied in the recommendations of Chapter 5.

Convergent and divergent thinking are complementary aspects of engineering
creativity. In engineering, divergent processes search for potential design solutions,
operational conditions, potential interactions, while convergent processes make sense of
what is found, analyzing and evaluating design performance. Oftentimes, these processes
are operating simultaneously. During trade studies, there are efforts to find and understand
various candidate designs at the same time as efforts to optimize and reduce the number of
selections. Sometimes, one of the two processes is dominant over the other. Verification,
validation, and design reviews are primarily convergent processes, checking to see if a
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design will perform as expected. In verification and validation, there is also divergent
thinking involved, such as in coming up with operational conditions at which to test the
design, but divergent thinking is subordinate to convergent thinking. In all, convergent and
divergent thinking work together toward making designs that effectively satisfy the needs
of the end user.

Depending on how difficult it is to develop a system that satisfies the user needs driving
a program’s requirements – which can result from many factors, such as how advanced the
design space is, or the budget and schedule allotted for program completion – there is a
range of potential designs for those user needs. There is an enormous variety of possibilities
for how a design process can unfold. Sometimes, there are many feasible design solutions
to the RFP. Sometimes, there are no feasible design solutions to an RFP. And there can be
a whole spectrum of gray in between, a whole range of uncertainty about the user needs
and the requirements formed to articulate them. For instance, here are some ways that can
pan out. The customer can request a system with feasible goals and the designers work to
meet them. The customer can request a system with infeasible goals and designers develop
requirements which are attainable but do not meet the user needs exactly. The customer
inadequately articulates their goals, and the designers develop requirements that better
address the user’s actual needs. There can be recognition of shortcomings in both the
communicability of the user needs and the feasibility of designs to meet them. There can
be ongoing tension and struggle regarding the articulation of user needs and the feasibility
of designs intended to satisfy those goals. In practice, there could be any number of cases
where a user need is not exactly captured by a set of requirements. The point in mentioning
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them is to emphasize that there is a divergence of many potential design spaces, and that
there is a need to converge the design spaces to candidate configurations which can be
prioritized and downselected. The necessary dynamic between divergence and
convergence that arises even in the early phases of formulating requirements is an example
of the creative process.

More broadly speaking, during conceptual design, design spaces are explored and
examined through activities like the deriving of requirements and trade studies. First, there
is a process of developing derived requirements, which starts out with many possibilities
and is then refined. Once major constraints are established for the design, a design space is
mapped, which excludes infeasible designs and opens up a range of potential
configurations. This design space is optimized down to a set of candidate configurations.
Then, more work is done to study each of these configurations so that they can be
compared. This is followed by a process of downselection to find a conceptual design
suitable to the user needs.

The processes of expansion – imagining possible derived requirements, mapping a
design space, studying candidate configurations – are divergent processes. The processes
of reduction – defining a design space with derived requirements, disregarding inefficient
configurations, downselecting candidate configurations – are convergent processes.
Divergent processes expand the set of candidate designs and relate aspects of different
designs. Convergent processes reduce the set of candidate designs and organize aspects of
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a design toward the end user needs. Figure 2 represents this interplay between convergent
and divergent processes in conceptual design.

Figure 2. Convergent and divergent interplay in conceptual design. (Gipson, 2017)

Convergent and divergent processes occur throughout design and development, not just
in conceptual design, such as in the design of a component, where many candidate designs
are analyzed, synthesized, and evaluated. In analysis, there is a range of potential designs
examined, then refined. In synthesis, the same happens on the level of integration. Then in
evaluation, various test conditions are selected and then the system is verified and
validated.

The interplay of convergent and divergent thinking in engineering is a synthesis of
linear conceptual thinking and nonlinear intuitive thinking. Engineering is not only
comprised of conceptualizing, analyzing, and linear organization. Engineering integrates
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affective divergent thinking alongside conceptual convergent thinking. This observation
leads to a significant conclusion. Just as complexity in systems engineering presents an
inherent dissonance between the linearity of reasoning and the nonlinearity of complexity,
creativity presents a means for coordinating between convergent thinking and divergent
thinking. Thus, the creative processes of engineering provide a mechanism for addressing
the paradigmatic challenge of complexity in aerospace. This conclusion will be examined
in greater detail in the following section.

3.3 Rationale for Creativity as a Complexity Management Strategy

Creativity involves an integration between linear and nonlinear thinking, which has the
implication that facilitating creativity is a promising candidate for managing complexity.
The majority of researchers of creativity agree that creativity integrates linear, conceptual
thinking with nonlinear, intuitive thinking, although there is disagreement on how exactly
that occurs. The research here by no means attempts to resolve the question. The prime
importance of this finding is that creativity could be used as a mechanism to manage
complexity. In this section, there are two areas of complexity that creativity has potential
to address. There is the complexity that is perennial to all engineering programs, such as
the objective complexity of unforeseen circumstances and the subjective complexity
introduced by people working on a program. And there is the paradigmatic problem of
complex system development, which is the main focus of this thesis.
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3.3.1 Fostering Creativity as a Response to Common Sources of Complexity

Whether or not an engineering system is complex, there has always been some amount
of complexity common to engineering programs. Here are four common areas of
complexity in engineering programs that fostering creativity can address: the objective
complexity of unforeseen circumstances, the subjective complexity of people involved in
a program, the subjective complexity of user needs, and the complexity of efficiently
designing to a set of user needs.

All engineering programs have some emergent properties, such as integration effects,
unresearched flight conditions, and changes in the program budget or timeline. These can
be considered as objective complexities. Although there will always be some unknown
unknowns in any program, fostering creativity can help in mitigating the risk of these
complexities by increasing the adaptability of the design organization. Creativity increases
the likelihood of imagining unforeseen circumstances and developing effective responses
to those emergent properties when they do arise (Cziksentmihalyi, 1996).

Even if an engineering system is not itself objectively complex, the development
process involves people, and they can introduce subjective complexity into the program.
With many employees working on a program, there becomes more potential for
misunderstandings and diverging goals. A large engineering program is difficult to
coordinate. Systems engineers have the responsibility of trying to coordinate between the
different groups in a program to satisfy the program’s requirements within allocated time
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and budget. Each engineering group and sub-group has its own emphasis, which means
that they approach the system-level requirements program from different angles (Drake,
2018-19). This introduces subjective complexity into the program. When the vehicle under
design is itself objectively complex, the challenge of coordinating and integrating the work
of many engineers becomes that much more difficult. Fostering creativity through systems
engineering methodologies can help provide balance between convergent and divergent
thinking on an organizational scale, so that the complexity of managing the diverse teams
is more intuitive and cohesive (Lehrer, 2012). For creativity, the challenge of making sense
of many threads of highly interrelated information that is also constantly in flux is not an
obstacle but rather acts as a positive motivator for problem solving (Csikszentmihalyi,
1996).

There is also a subjective complexity that emerges in the difference between user needs
and formal requirements. Ultimately, requirements are determined from user needs.
Requirements should be well-formed, clearly articulated, and verifiable (Drake, 2018-19).
Essentially, program requirements should be linear. User needs, on the other hand, are by
nature more nonlinear than the requirements developed to articulate them (Vincenti, 1990).
As mentioned, there is a lot of gray area in trying to create and satisfy feasible requirements
that adequately express user needs. There can be competing objectives in different
requirements, requirements can misrepresent their corresponding user need, requirements
can be poorly written, user needs can be impractical to begin with, etc.. User needs come
from people, and so they are not guaranteed to be coherent. The challenge of formulating
effective requirements for qualitative user needs is a subjective complexity. Fostering
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creativity can address this area of complexity by increasing the design organization’s
ability to create effective requirements. Moreover, enhanced creativity makes it easier to
see how to satisfy apparently competing objectives or to address the user need behind the
requirement in an unexpected way (Cummings & Hall, 2004). This transitions into the
fourth area of complexity perennial to engineering programs.

Fourthly, the process of figuring out how to design a successful system is itself a
subjectively complex undertaking. Overseeing an engineering program involves many
interdependent, moving pieces, and coordinating the program toward making a system that
fulfils the system-level requirements can be a serious challenge. The design and
development process can take on coordinating between various hierarchies, groups,
individuals, teams, organizations, etc. is by no means simple. Aerospace design is
inherently a complex process. Despite this complexity, it is true that there are many
successful systems in flight today. Although there have been numerous programs which
ended in disorder as inefficient hairballs, some flight systems exhibit such a high degree of
efficiency and sophistication that they are widely considered to be elegant systems.
Creativity can turn the subjective complexity of aerospace design into an elegant system
(Griffin, 2010). As a fundamentally creative process, improving the creativity of an
engineering program can also mitigate some of the emergent risk inherent to any design
process. This is by no means a new solution approach to the problem of complex systems
engineering. Many best practices of systems engineering already function to facilitate
engineering creativity.
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3.3.2 Fostering Creativity as a Response to Complex System Development

Beyond addressing various areas of complexity that commonly appear in engineering
programs, fostering the creative process through systems engineering can function as a
mechanism for obtaining requisite variety in complex system development. As stated, the
interplay of convergent and divergent thinking in creativity integrates linear and nonlinear
types of information. In the creative process, reasoning and intuition are complementary
cognitive faculties. Psychologists often consider intuition as primary process and
reasoning as secondary process, because intuitive information is not abstracted from sense
experience whereas rational concepts are abstracted. Creativity is sometimes classified as
a tertiary process, in that it primary and secondary process (Runco, 2020). From this
perspective, the paradigmatic problem of complex systems engineering is that there is a
need for tertiary processes, since they integrate linear and nonlinear types of information.
Creativity, as a tertiary process, can fulfill this role.

This idea is reinforced by research on creative personality traits, shown in Figure 3.
Many of the traits, processes, and abilities important in creativity are also important for
managing complex systems, such as tolerance of ambiguity, openness to experience,
curiosity, preference for challenge, preference for complexity, and risk-taking. This
supports that effectively managing complex domains and facilitating creative behavior are
complementary aims.
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Figure 3. Creative personality traits, creative affective processes,
and creative cognitive abilities, arranged based on empirical studies (Russ, 1993).

Facilitating creativity through systems engineering can function as a mechanism to
account for the subjective complexity of developing objectively complex systems.
Creativity is itself a complex process, a tertiary process, and for this reason it can be used
to give engineers a cognitive edge on the challenge of working in a complex design domain.
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In Section 5.1, this idea is represented as an actual systems engineering group that functions
in a similar manner to creative tertiary process. For now, this information is a rationale for
why creativity could be used to decrease emergent risk.

3.4 Motivational Factors in Creativity

Creativity is an affect-laden process, and, as such, emotions play a central role in being
or not being creative. Creativity is highly dependent on motivational factors.
Understanding these motivational factors is critical for the present study. Before going
further, two clarifications will be made.

First, creative motivational factors tend to be consistent across scales. In other words,
individuals and groups can be motivated to be creative in similar ways. The difference is
that rather than facilitating the creativity of one mind thinking on its own, creativity is
facilitated for a collection of minds interacting together. Many of the patterns of creative
behavior can be abstracted in a way that is consistent across these scales, from an individual
mind to small teams, all the way up to a large organization (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996).

Second, empirical studies have shown that everyone is creative, especially during
childhood (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). It is not true that creativity is an innate quality limited
to some, where some are virtuosos, and some are not, even though it is true that there are
definite personality traits associated with creativity (Russ, 1993). One’s tendency to remain
creative past childhood is facilitated through a combination of nature and nurture, i.e., one’s
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biological predisposition and the environment in which one was raised (Csikszentmihalyi,
1996; Lehrer, 2012). In the vast majority of cases, when creativity is discouraged or not
utilized, it becomes a forgotten skill. Yet, it can be relearned through practice under the
right conditions (Lehrer, 2012). Now we will proceed to examine the motivational factors
behind creativity.

3.4.1 Defining Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation

Intrinsic motivation facilitates creativity and extrinsic motivation hinders creativity.
Intrinsic motivation is based on individual desire, a love for doing a task for its own sake
and is characterized by a free-flowing state of focus known as “flow” (Russ, 1993;
Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). On the other hand, because creative processes are sensitive to
internal affective states, blocking attention from internal feelings can inhibit creativity.
This tends to occur through the introduction of stressful external performance expectations
on an individual’s internal thinking and feeling states. This is called extrinsic motivation.
Extrinsic motivation is based on external performance goals and tends to involve stressful
feelings and divided thoughts. Major creativity researchers Amabile (1996) and Hennessey
(1996) give five “sure-fire killers of intrinsic motivation and creativity: expected reward,
expected evaluation, surveillance, time limits, and competition.”

“Over 25 years of investigation into these motivational orientations have led us to
the Intrinsic Motivation Principle of Creativity (IMPC): Intrinsic motivation is
conducive to creativity, and extrinsic motivation is almost always detrimental. In
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its earlier incarnations, this proposed relation between motivational state and
creativity of performance was advanced as a tentative research hypothesis. But
investigators working in this tradition have gathered so much unequivocal
empirical evidence that this proposition has been elevated to the status of an
undisputed principle.” (Hennessey, 2003).

Aerospace engineering’s relationship with extrinsic motivation will be examined
intermittently in the remainder of this thesis. For now, note that insofar as aerospace
programs foster “expected reward, expected evaluation, surveillance, time limits, and
competition,” the creativity of aerospace engineers is hindered.

Formal mechanisms designed to foster creativity often end up restricting creativity
unintentionally, because the motivational factors behind creativity are poorly understood
(Lehrer, 2012; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Cummings & Hall, 2004). Creativity is a complex
process that depends on many tightly coupled motivational factors. Attempting to
deterministically cause creativity to happen through external constraints, such as
hierarchies and protocols, can produce extrinsic motivation that, in turn, blocks off the
affective states necessary for divergent thinking and tertiary processing. Creative
endeavors become inflexible, intolerant of uncertainty, and productivity-focused when
extrinsic motivation becomes dominant (Russ, 1993). Yet, even in spite of circumstances
in aerospace programs where extrinsic motivation is dominant, creativity can still
overcome the negative pressure (Cummings & Hall, 2004). The fact that many large,
complex aerospace systems have been created attests to it.
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3.4.2 External Systems Engineering Constraints Can Facilitate Intrinsic Motivation

Formal systems engineering methodologies can be used to facilitate creativity because
external constraints are not the same as extrinsic motivation. In fact, external constraints,
such as program timelines and detailed requirements, can be powerful intrinsic motivators
of creativity. When constraints are treated in a purely technical manner, detached from
notions of social standing, constraints can encourage engineers to rise to the challenge.
External pressure can actually drive intrinsic motivation (Lehrer, 2012; Csikszentmihalyi,
1996). The difference between constructive constraints, producing intrinsic motivation,
and obstructive constraints, producing extrinsic motivation, has largely to do with
workplace culture. And as explained earlier, creativity is not a formless generation of novel
ideas, because it involves both novelty and technical skill. Formless idea-generation
“derives only from nonconformity, lack of discipline, blind rejection of what already exists,
and simply letting oneself go… [it] has many of the elements of genuine creativity – such
as a high level of fantasy – but only a tenuous connection with reality” (Cropley, 2006).
Creativity has structure, meaning that external constraints can be constructive to creativity.
Consequently, it is not necessary to abandon formal systems engineering methodologies in
order to better facilitate creativity. This is elaborated upon in Section 3.6.

Requirements, schedules, and criticism in design reviews are likewise not inherent
obstacles to creativity. Being creative does not require a lack of dissent and complete
acceptance of novel ideas. On the contrary, there is strong empirical evidence that
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brainstorming – a process in which criticism toward diverse ideas is supposed to be
withheld – can reduce team creativity. Creativity does not thrive in an absence of dissent,
but in an environment of mutual respect amid cooperative friction (Catmull, 2014; Levi,
2017). “When the team is exposed to contradictory ideas from some members, the thinking
of the majority is stimulated, producing ideas that are more creative. Dissent stimulates
divergent thinking and encourages the team to view an issue from multiple perspectives.”
(Levi, 2017). A 2010 study showed that:

“Both too little and too much task conflict can inhibit creativity. The most creative
teams had moderate levels of task conflict that occurred during the early stages of
the team’s project. Novel ideas, which arise from task-related conflict during early
team discussions, were more likely to be valued and used to develop creative
solutions. To encourage creativity, team leaders need to recognize that some
conflict is good and give team members time early in the project to voice their
opinions. In addition, team leaders need to create a climate of psychological safety
so team members feel safe bringing up new ideas.” (Levi, 2017).

3.4.3 Balancing Convergent and Divergent Thinking to Produce Intrinsic Motivation

Honing Theory provides a concise formulation for conditions favorable to intrinsic
motivation. Under HT, creativity is facilitated through the balance of two factors: (1)
variety of information available and (2) the probability of associating that information.
Creativity operates on the edge of chaos as a kind of critical transition state (Gabora, 2017).
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Creative environments provide just enough variety of information and just enough
probability of associating that information that convergent and divergent thinking can
easily coordinate. When there is too little variety or association, the creative state is
subcritical: there is not enough background information or imaginative recombination to
develop anything novel. When there is too much variety or association, the creative state
is supercritical: there is too much information and imaginative recombination to focus
resources. The subcritical state is too convergent; the supercritical state is too divergent.
Table 1 displays various combinations of states.

Table 1. Conditions for a creative critical state. (Gabora, 2017)

Low Association

Moderate Association

High Association

Few Ideas

Subcritical

Subcritical-Critical

Critical

Moderate Ideas

Subcritical-Critical Critical

Critical-Supercritical

Many Ideas

Critical

Supercritical

Critical-Supercritical

HT does not prescribe a methodology for obtaining creative criticality. Creative
criticality can be achieved in many ways. There is an optimal range for intrinsic motivation
when there is a balance between convergence and divergence. For instance, a highly
formalized engineering program might decrease the variety of ideas and the likelihood of
associative thinking. However, an engineering program with very little formality might err
on the side of being so divergent that order cannot be made out of the chaos. There should
be a cohesive combination of heterogeneity and flexibility such that a program can come
up with novel ideas and put them to good use. A homogeneous team working on a program
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with very little formality could struggle to come up with many ideas, but the freedom their
program has could give them high association, letting them be creative. Likewise, a
heterogeneous team working on a highly formalized program could come up with many
ideas with strong potential, and the regulated environment keeps them on track so that they
can meet their program goals. An imbalance of variety of information or associative
probability can lead to an uncreative program. A lack or excess of both these factors can
also lead to an uncreative program. HT posits that there are many ways to achieve a balance
for creative criticality. It should be the job of systems engineers to evaluate what their
organization should do to work toward creative criticality. In Section 3.6, we will compare
how Agile and Waterfall systems engineering methodologies attempt at producing creative
criticality.

Creativity depends on intrinsic motivation. Trying to deterministically generate creative
behavior risks imposing extrinsic motivation. Even so, external constraints – such as
requirements, design criticism, and timelines – can facilitate intrinsic motivation. What
differentiates external constraints that lead to intrinsic motivation from those that lead to
extrinsic motivation is specific to a workplace environment. A concise way of evaluating
if a workplace culture is favorable to creativity is through Honing Theory’s notion of
creative criticality. To be creative, there needs to be an optimal combination of diversity of
ideas and probability of associating those ideas. Under this umbrella, there are many ways
to facilitate creativity, and it is the responsibility of systems engineers to evaluate this on a
program-specific basis. In the next section, we will look at how the entire development
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process is a creative process. This will ground an understanding of how systems
engineering plays a role in shaping the creativity of an aerospace program.

3.5 Stages of Creativity

Engineering is fundamentally a creative process. The entire development process of an
aerospace system can be understood as a creative process. Yet, a single program is not
merely on process but is composed of many smaller creative processes. Engineering
programs are often organized at different levels of detail, from a sequence of design phases
that governs the whole program, all the way down to the work packages in Statements of
Work. Similarly, there are natural stages that form the creative problem-solving process.
In this section, we will build a concept of engineering as a series of intermediate creative
processes; look at the stages of the creative process in general; and comparatively apply
these stages to design phases. In Appendix A, the creative process is also compared to three
other representations of the engineering process: analysis-synthesis-evaluation, the
engineering “V,” and Technology Readiness Levels. No similar work that compares the
creative process to aerospace design phases has been found in the literature. What follows
is a novel integration of findings from creativity research into the field of aerospace
engineering.
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3.5.1 Engineering is a Chain of Intermediate Creative Processes

In an idealized sense, the entire engineering development process consists of a series of
interdependent, intermediate development processes. An engineering program begins with
a set of user needs being formulated into system-level requirements. Then, the RFP
containing the user needs and/or system-level requirements, is used as the basis for a
program plan. The program plan is used to establish and coordinate an organization of
engineers. Following this, the design process begins, and then the manufacturing process.
Note: these processes can happen sequentially, concurrently, or recurrently, depending on
the specific program; and, for simplicity, operation, maintenance, and disposal are
excluded, since the focus of this thesis is on engineering creativity, not engineering
maintenance. Each entity involved can be called an intermediate system and each process
can be called an intermediate creative process. Each intermediate development is its own
creative process, in which one intermediate system is used to create another. User needs
are used to create an RFP. An RFP is used to create a program plan. A program plan is
used to organize a program. An organization is used to design a system. A design is used
to manufacture the system. The product of each intermediate development is the starting
point for the next intermediate development. Although the contractor may evaluate and
modify the system-level requirements to map better onto user needs, as well as derive other
requirements from them, their work begins with requirements. From there, the engineers
will expand the scope and detail of the program until the final end product meets (or does
not meet) the user needs. From this point of view, the first intermediate process, the
formulation of user needs into requirements, is a sort of inverse process to the remaining
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intermediate processes. The “user side” of development and the “design side” of
development function having inverted goals. In Section 6.2, this model will be used to
propose a method for modeling complexity throughout a program.

Of course, this model also simplifies away the various phases of design and the critical
milestones throughout a program plan. The point here is to show that engineering consists
of a series of interrelated developments with a variety of intermediate products rather than
a single, linear work path ending with a single technical system. The quality of the
coordination of earlier intermediate developments tends to cascade down through the
subsequent processes; and since there are greater marginal gains for reducing risk the
earlier along in the development process (Raymer, 2002), it is justifiable to consider
nontechnical processes and deliverables as having critical importance to engineering
programs. Many of these nontechnical processes are the responsibility of systems
engineering. In the upcoming sub-sections, we will examine stages in the creative process
and then relate these to aerospace design phases.

3.5.2 Stages of the Creative Process

The creative problem-solving process consists of stages of behavior loosely related in a
sequence. Different formulations of the creative process exist in the literature, and the
distinct details are less important than the general arc of how an idea is formed and brought
to fruition. This sequence is generally outlined as (1) problem finding, (2) preparation, (3)
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incubation, (4) illumination, (5) verification, and (6) implementation (Wallas, 1926; Russ,
1993; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996).

In slightly fuller terms: (1) the problem at hand must be given constraints (problem
finding); (2) the problem must be researched and evaluated (preparation); (3) the
information must be allowed to incubate, “without the individual directly, logically
working on the problem,” and to be filtered through complex mental processes, many of
which happen “outside conscious awareness” (Russ, 1993) (incubation); (4) there is a
moment of insight harmoniously synthesizing many lines of thought, often described as a
“flash” (illumination); (5) an analytical working-through of the uncovered idea
(verification); (5) and an out-working of the idea into practical application
(implementation).

This series of stages is not a strict rule but rather summarizes the most important
elements of creative development. It is often not followed in this exact order, since creative
processes tend to involve concurrent threads of work. Others have outlined the creative
process as generation, promotion, design, implementation, and evaluation (Thompson,
2007), but, again, the specific details that differentiates them are negligible. Do note that
the creative act is not considered the moment of imagining a solution to a problem or the
moment of finally implementing it. Creativity is really an ongoing activity that begins with
a vague sense of an unformulated problem and ends with the problem being specifically
addressed. Figure 4 shows the sequence with a color-coding that will be followed in later
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figures. Incubation and illumination are both colored green because the moment of
illumination often happens spontaneously during incubation.

Figure 4. Stages of creativity. (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996)

3.5.3 Creative Stages of Aerospace Engineering Programs

This process can be easily mapped onto a typical timeline for aerospace system
development. Aerospace programs historically tend to follow the “Waterfall” program
structure, in which the work of conceptual design cascades into preliminary design,
preliminary design cascades into detail design, detail design into manufacturing, then
operation and maintenance, and finally disposal. Of course, this sequence of phases is not
strictly necessary, it is a convention. Essentially, the design phases provide a meaningful
structure that is useful for the customer and the supplier. Conceptual design provides time
for the feasibility of the system to be evaluated without expending a lot of resources. It also
makes it easier for the customer to select between multiple bidders. Preliminary design
yields a more robust design than conceptual design and gives the customer a chance to step
back from the contract before committing an even larger amount of resources to it. Detail
design involves the finishing touches on the system and final verifications and validations
before manufacturing begins and all its costs are incurred. Maintenance and disposal
involve a much smaller workforce, and the engineering tasks pertain much less to design
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than to operational integration, upkeep, and updating. The fact this sequence is recurrently
employed in aerospace programs shows its effectiveness.

As described in Section 3.5, every phase of design has some form of product as its goal,
even though they are intermediate steps toward the final product. In this way, each phase
of design follows its own creative process. The product of each intermediate design phase
in turn leads to the creation of the next phase and its product. It is as if the set of user needs
“unfolds” into an RFP, the RFP unfolds into a conceptual design, the conceptual design
into a preliminary design, the preliminary design into a detail design, the detail design into
an actual system. Each design phase creates the groundwork for the next design phase. The
creativity sequence can be mapped onto individual phases or onto the entire series of design
phases. In practice, the six stages of the creative process do not typically map linearly onto
the engineering timeline but rather occur following a variety of orders: concurrently
throughout design, recurrently in different phases, as well as incrementally in some aspects.
First, we will look at how the creative process maps onto the entire design process (Figure
5). Then we will look at how the creative process maps onto the processes of developing
an RFP, conceptual design, and preliminary design (Figure 6). Since there are greater gains
to be made on emergent risk mitigation in earlier phases of design programs (Raymer,
2002), the later phases will not be considered here.
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Figure 5. Creative stages applied to a Waterfall development program.

(1) Problem Finding: In the beginning, there is a user with some set of needs, and
these needs are where the engineering design process originates. The customer representing
the user will do work to understand their set of specific needs and formulate them into
system-level requirements, publishing a Request for Proposal (RFP). They may collaborate
with contractors and consultants during that process. A contractor may also first approach
them with a formulated set of needs and the potential for a system to meet those needs.
(2) Preparation: After an RFP has been published with a set of system-level
requirements, the early phases of contractor work begin, starting with program planning.
Before committing to a program, a contractor will develop a program plan in order to
evaluate whether the contract is worth pursuing. This plan will include a study of the
required system capabilities, a Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) and Statement of Work
(SoW), a corresponding budget and schedule, an estimate of risk, and other related
activities. If the program seems feasible and worthy of investing resources, the contractor
will move forward to designing and developing the system. The contractor may begin by
evaluating the user and stakeholder needs, deriving requirements from those needs and
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from the RFP, and consulting with experts and legacy knowledge. Various trade studies
are performed so as to develop candidate configurations. Downselections occur. Cycles of
analysis, synthesis, and evaluation refine the design.
(3) Incubation: Eventually, the detail design is tested and evaluated to see if it is
predicted to satisfy performance requirements. If the system does not, redesign may occur.
(4) Illumination: Verification and validation demonstrate that the design is
predicted to satisfy performance requirements. The design has converged. The customer
agrees to purchase the system in a Critical Design Review, and/or makes final
recommendations for redesign.
(5) Verification: Secondary checks occur after a final design review, final edits to
the design are made. The system design is translated into a format that is suited for
manufacturing. Legacy documents are established for operation, maintenance, and
disposal.
(6) Implementation: The system is manufactured, operated, maintained, and
eventually disposed. (Drake, 2018-19; Cropley & Cropley, 1999; Cropley, 2015)

However, this is a major simplification of the design and development process. As
stated in Section 2.1, within each program, there are numerous intermediate development
processes with their own products, such as an RFP, a program plan, an organization, the
conceptual design, the preliminary design, various prototypes and articles of test hardware,
the detail design, the instructions for manufacturing, the tangible end product. The whole
engineering process consists of creative sub-processes. There is not one, incremental, linear
creative process, but numerous, looped, nonlinear creative processes. Any engineering
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program consists of serial processes, parallel processes, and recurrent processes. Looking
at the earlier phases of a program, a simplified representation of the creative process is as
follows:

Figure 6. Creative stages applied to the early intermediate development phases.

From Need to RFP:
(1) Problem Finding: The user develops a need, though they may not yet be aware of it.
(2) Preparation: Around the same time, the customer or contractor performs research to
understand the user’s need for a potential system.
(3) Incubation: The customer reflects on the prior research.
(4) Illumination: The user’s need is formulated into requirements and an RFP is written to
formalize this.
(5) Verification: The verification stage is then handed off to the contractor, to derive
requirements and see if there is a feasible system that can satisfy the required functions.
(6) Implementation: The implementation of the RFP follows as the remainder of the
program.
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From RFP to Conceptual Design Review (CoDR):
(1) Problem Finding: The RFP, user and stakeholder needs, and system-level requirements
are identified.
(2) Preparation: A program plan is established. Requirements are derived from RFP and
user needs. Research and trade studies are performed in the process of developing a
candidate configuration
(3) Incubation: Various performance estimates begin as models s are sorted through,
looking for solutions that converge on the user needs. Downselections occur.
(4) Illumination: Various trade studies and design optimization tools produce converged
results.
(5) Verification: A System Requirements Review (SRR) is performed, evaluating the
system-level and derived requirements to see if the required system is tenable. Verification
and validation is performed on trade studies and configuration designs, leading to
downselections. Candidate configuration is evaluated by contractor and customer in a
CoDR.
(6) Implementation: Implementation of the conceptual design proceeds as the remainder of
the program.

From CoDR to Preliminary Design Review (PDR):
(1) Problem Finding: The prior phases of the program largely serve to establish the
preliminary design phase. Work packages for preliminary design are based on the outputs
of the conceptual design phase.
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(2) Preparation: Analysis proceeds on the various subsystems and components.
(3) Incubation: Models are synthesized.
(4) Illumination: Outputs converge.
(5) Verification: Verification and validations occur in anticipation of the Preliminary
Design Review (PDR).
(6) Implementation: Everything after the PDR serves as the implementation of the
preliminary design: detail design, manufacturing, operation, maintenance, and disposal.

3.6 Creativity in Agile and Waterfall Methodologies

Facilitating creativity takes on different forms depending on the structure of the design
program. In the previous section, we described the creative process in terms of a
historically conventional Waterfall methodology. Now, we analyze how the Agile and
Waterfall methodologies approach creativity in different ways. Such an analysis has not
been found in the literature on engineering creativity, so this section in itself is an attempt
to open up an entirely new area of research.

3.6.1 Introduction to Creativity in Systems Engineering

Managing complexity can be a serious challenge. It is therefore important to understand
the pros and cons of these systems engineering methodologies. By looking at how these
strategies relate to creativity, we can develop a better picture of the leverage points for
obtaining greater degrees of control over complex aerospace systems.
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Before going on, we will acknowledge the limitations of systems engineering to
facilitate creativity in general. As mentioned, creativity is itself a complex process of
cognition and behavior. It is a nondeterministic process. Attempting to force people to be
creative can actually produce extrinsic motivation that hinders creativity. Nevertheless, it
is well-known that particular conditions do tend to be favorable for the affect states and
intrinsic motivation essential to creativity. Increasing creativity requires an assortment of
modifications to organizational practices grounded in a nuanced understanding of the
organization’s specific context, so that motivational factors are adequately accounted for
(Lehrer, 2012; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). Systems engineering can use creativity as a
mechanism for managing complexity insofar as systems engineering methods can be made
favorable to intrinsic motivation.

That being said, creativity involves so many external and internal factors that there is
no set of clear-cut, surefire methods for facilitating it. By that same token, there is a great
variety of possible ways to facilitate creativity. A general framework for creativity may be
true to the complexity of factors involved in creativity, but it is not particularly practical.
For now, we will focus on a general understanding of the goals and limitations of Agile
and Waterfall. This can provide a sense of scope for what these methodologies are good at
accomplishing. It would be the responsibility of systems engineers to adjust their methods
of facilitating creativity for each specific program. In Chapters 4 and 5, we will focus on
more applicable methods.
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In a way, systems engineers oversee the creative processes of engineering. Systems
engineers coordinate different disciplines and integrate high-level program goals with lowlevel work packages. This is very similar to how creativity coordinates different ideas,
convergent thinking, and divergent thinking, integrating specific and general into a unified
product. We will therefore be thinking of systems engineering as analogous to creativity,
and systems engineering methodologies as being similar to different styles to being
creative.

The primary difference between how the Agile and Waterfall methodologies foster
creativity is in their approach toward formalization. Agile follows a more nonlinear,
concurrent workflow, whereas Waterfall follows a more linear, serial workflow. First,
Agile and Waterfall will be described, and then their relationship to creativity will be
studied.

3.6.2 The Agile Methodology

Agile (Figure 7) divides a development program into a series of modules, in which
separable elements of the system are developed from start to finish in a relatively short
amount of time. Meanwhile, there is a concurrent process of integrating and testing the
design. Agile emphasizes dynamic and open-ended development, prioritizing interaction
over processes and tools, working products over exhaustive documentation, collaborating
with customers over negotiating contracts, and action over planning (“Agile Manifesto,”
2001).
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Figure 7. Agile development process in colors of creative stages.

Even so, “the Agile movement is not anti-methodology.” (“Agile Manifesto,” 2001).
Instead, Agile methods aim to manage complexity by relying on human interactions and
user-centered design. Rather than relying on formal methodology, Agile opens up the
engineering process to be actively and spontaneously changed by the people working on a
program. Agile relaxes on the side of systems engineering formality and focuses instead
on being dynamic and active. Agile is becoming more common as a systems engineering
strategy, and there are recommendations for how to integrate it into aerospace design,
including the Agile decision support system (ADSS) for aircraft design (Li et al., 2015).
The ADSS attempts “to reduce the adverse effects caused by a variety of subjective factors
in the decision-making process and to promote human-machine collaboration” (Li et al.,
2015).
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3.6.3 The Waterfall Methodology

A more historical aerospace workflow (Figure 8) follows a mostly incremental process.
It is often known as Waterfall for how each design phase cascades into the next. Waterfall
divides a program into a series of phases in which the entire system is designed, each time
to increasing levels of fidelity. This is not only convenient for the developer to avoid long
rework cycles, it is also convenient for the customer to be able to identify a potentially
successful system when it is less costly to commit additional resources to the program.
Although a typical program following Waterfall is not formalized to an extreme, it is
relatively more structured than an Agile program.

Figure 8. Waterfall development process in colors of creative stages.

3.6.4 Comparing Agile and Waterfall Creativity

Each of these methodologies place their focus on a different set of priorities, and as such
have a different set of inherent benefits and risks. Agile tends to resemble divergent
thinking, whereas Waterfall tends to resemble convergent thinking. The openness of Agile
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strengthens divergent behavior, which in turn helps manage a complex system. However,
that divergence can also pose a challenge when working on a complex system that is large.
A large program can become so sprawled out that centralization is important for success.
The formality of Waterfall strengthens convergent behavior, which helps manage a large
system. But, by being more convergent, it can be more difficult to adapt to a system’s
emergent behavior. Successfully implementing both approaches requires mechanisms to
be put in place for achieving creative criticality.

3.6.4.1 Discussion of Agile and Creativity

Agile methodologies loosen the structure of the entire development process: schedules
are

more

dynamic,

organizations

are

more

horizontal,

employees

are

less

compartmentalized, communication is faster, documentation is lighter. By decreasing the
amount of “red tape” in a program, there are fewer constraints and expectations placed on
engineers, allowing them to have a more open-minded attitude, giving them space to act
with greater autonomy and experiment, decreasing the risk they face if they fail, and
increasing the amount of interdisciplinary communication. Agile effectively makes the
engineering process more intuitive. In this way, Agile improves upon conventional
methods by increasing the number of interconnections in the program and tightens the
coupling between program elements, making the program itself more complex. This agility
is a way to increase the requisite variety of a program. By making a program more
intuitively structured, Agile embeds a greater propensity to finding, storing, and
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interpreting nonlinear information. This, in turn, makes a program capable of managing a
greater variety of tasks that a complex system must perform.

Although this gives Agile a greater degree of adaptability in a complex domains, there
is a tradeoff. By deregulating a program, Agile assigns the responsibility of handling
nonlinear information to the processes themselves. Individual agency and spontaneity are
traded at the expense of lost traceability. It is worth noting that Agile was created by
software developers, where the designs tend to be quickly iterable and any hardware testing
and manufacturing tends to be modular. It is more difficult to develop large, nonmodularizable systems using untraceable processes. Large aerospace engineering
programs tend, due to their scale, to require a high amount of coordination and be
conservative toward risk, meaning that traceability is often a high priority. It follows that
Agile would tend to be less appropriate for the development of large aerospace systems.
Since Agile defocuses on formality, as a methodology it theoretically places a limit on the
scale of complexity that is manageable.

This does not mean it is impossible to use Agile methods effectively in aerospace
programs. For instance, Aviation Week recently reported that the Joint Program Office
(JPO) is integrating Agile into F-35 software management: “the JPO is using Agile
software development tools that allow rapid updates and improvements like how Apple
updates its iPhones, while Lockheed employs Waterfall development that allows for
updates every 12-18 months.” (Hudson, 2020). Notably, Agile methods are being applied
to the logistics operations of F-35 software, not its hardware. There are aerospace programs
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where Agile can be an excellent method. Smaller programs with fewer requirements and
faster lifecycles are more suitable for Agile. Even components can be developed in an Agile
manner, though perhaps at the risk of going countercourse to the need for central
integration. Sometimes, Agile is suited for R&D projects, such as the development of the
jet engine:

“Success was not the result of ‘skillful management of technology and
organization,’…[but] stands rather as a shining example of non-linear, irrational,
uncertain, multi-lateral, and profoundly passionate technological and business
practice, yielding success not through planning but through dogged determination, a
certain indifference to failure (which secrecy aided), and massive expenditures of
public funds. The development of the early jet engines (in post-war America) is
described as a ‘messy, contingent, and intense process,’ driven by passion, Cold War
fears, and ‘the challenges of mastery (in engineering and in organizational terms).’
The development involved multiple technological areas, in which ‘no one understood
enough … about turbulent combustion, alloy metals, heat fatigue, or fluid dynamics
to approach scientific certainty or reliable knowledge.’ Designs did not always rely
on theoretical science, but ‘on empirical knowledge’ that came from the systematic
cycles of design, build, and test… ‘Engineers often did not know why something
worked, just that it worked’” (Young, 2007).

Space-X is another notable example of Agile being used successfully. The company
is known for tending to follow Agile methods, such as using less hierarchy and
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documentation and pushing for test early. By limiting hierarchy and documentation to
ensure that individuals can communicate freely enough to maintain a creative criticality,
Space-X has effectively managed the complexity of creating orbital vehicles through
thoughtful implementation of the Agile methodology (Berg, 2019).

It is generally more difficult to make improvements in fostering creativity by increasing
formality than by loosening formality (Lehrer, 2012; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Cummings
& Hall, 2004). There are numerous large aerospace programs that followed a methodology
similar to Waterfall in which complexity caused major expenses and setbacks. The NASP
and JSF programs had complex systems as their end product, and each program used a
widely distributed hierarchy of thousands of engineers to account for their respective
system’s complexity. Yet both programs were riddled with major failures due to poor
coordination of engineers and poor planning with respect to complexity. The requirements
of these programs were far more nuanced and challenging than their conglomerated
organizational hierarchy could efficiently control. The subjective complexity of developing
these objectively complex systems led to large cost and schedule overruns. Such failures
can be thought of as caused by obstacles in the engineering creative process. In practice, it
tends to be extraordinarily difficult to successful create large, complex aerospace systems.

3.6.4.2 Discussion of Waterfall and Creativity

Despite the difficulty, there is still potential for improving the creative capacity of
Waterfall methodologies, because being creative is not the opposite of having external
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constraints. Throughout the creativity research literature, practical recommendations for
fostering creativity tend to be simple methods for flattening organizational hierarchy and
informalizing processes. As mentioned, creativity has so many dependencies it is usually
impractical to develop a systematic strategy for increasing creativity that is guaranteed to
work in all cases. Formalizing mechanisms to generate creativity tend to inhibit creativity,
precisely because there are so many motivational factors behind creativity that any attempt
to control it is not grounded in sufficient knowledge (Lehrer, 2012; Csikszentmihalyi,
1996; Cummings & Hall, 2004). It tends to be easier to offer simple practical suggestions
that coincidentally correspond to creativity than to take on the challenge of forming a
process that resembles creativity. It is easier to facilitate creativity by using a process that
resembles divergent thinking, as in the case of Agile, than by using a process that resembles
convergent thinking, as in the case of Waterfall. As such, it can be easy to slip into the
belief that creativity is the same as undisciplined idea-generation. However, creativity
researchers are in consensus that this belief is a serious misconception (Cropley, 2006).
Creativity is a complex behavior that uses a synthesis of divergent and convergent thinking
to produce order. In other words, creativity is better understood as a tertiary process than
an intuitive primary process. Creativity is not inherently disorganized. It follows that
adhering to Agile principles is not the only methodological option for responding to
complexity in aerospace; there is the potential to improve upon Waterfall. It may be more
difficult to be creative in a formal environment than an informal one, but it is nevertheless
possible. The research in this project uncovered a great deal of literature emphasizing Agile
methods for creativity and found very little information on creativity by means of systems
engineering formalities. This suggests there is potential for improving the creativity of
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Waterfall that has yet to be capitalized. The two strategies given in Chapter 5 are designed
as improvements on a conventional Waterfall methodology.

The research in this project suggests that Waterfall can be adapted to better facilitate
creativity by considering the entire development process as a creative process, and then
looking for areas where systems engineers can better associate and coordinate information.
Although Waterfall as a whole resembles convergent thinking, just as Agile as a whole
resembles divergent thinking, the work that successful systems engineers perform
resembles divergent thinking and tertiary process.

Effective resource management is necessary for any system development, complex or
not. In complex system development, resources should be managed with a greater degree
of attention toward the potential for emergent behavior, in both the objective system and
in the subjective processes implemented to develop the system. It is certainly possible for
formal mechanisms to be put in place that give attention to unknown unknowns and the
potential for complex interdependencies. For instance, in the case of the Apollo Program,
the high amount of system complexity was dealt effectively with by dramatically
increasing the formal hierarchy of the program’s organization. Although the program went
beyond its expected resources, the high degree of formal coordination ensured that the
program successfully created the end product (Johnson, 2006). Poor coordination of
information is one of the root causes of emergent risk. Although emergent behaviors cannot
be predicted, they can be searched for, reducing the risk that they can pose. The Apollo
program had many systems engineering mechanisms for associating and coordinating
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information between organizational subdivisions, so as to address complexity before its
risks snowballed. By providing many pathways for information to cross the organizational
hierarchy, the systems engineers functioned like divergent thinking. By integrating the
information of the program and focusing it toward the system-level requirements, they
functioned like tertiary process. Given that the monumental program was, by many
accounts, successful, it can be inferred that the systems engineering coordination achieved
creative criticality: a balance of variety of information and likelihood of associating that
information. If there were less coordination of information, i.e., if there were poorer
communication, the Apollo program likely would have become tangled up to the point of
crumbling under its own weight, as in the case of NASP. On the contrary, there was so
much intelligently applied formality that the program managed to achieve its major goals.
Effectively, the complex systems engineering of Apollo succeeded at facilitating programwide creativity. Making the work of systems engineers resemble divergent thinking and
tertiary process is a way to increase the creativity of Waterfall.

3.6.5 Summary of Comparison of Creativity in Agile and Waterfall

Facilitating creativity through formal systems engineering methods in aerospace
programs is not a well-researched topic. On the other hand, how Agile methods increase
creativity is a well-researched topic. Thus, there is the potential to make advances on the
problem of managing complexity by way of altering protocols to better resemble creativity.
The primary difference between facilitating creativity through Agile or Waterfall is in their
resemblance to divergent thinking or convergent thinking.
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In Agile creativity, systems engineering formalities are loosened enough that engineers
can adapt freely to complexities that emerge throughout the development process. This
freedom gives them an appropriate variety of information and an appropriate level of
association. Yet there is enough structure that they do not lose focus from the major
program goals. In this way, creative criticality is achieved in a dynamic manner. However,
coincidentally facilitating creativity by loosening formality to resemble divergent thinking
is perhaps not enough for developing large aerospace systems. It is important to address
the root cause of the emergent risk of subjective complexity: poor coordination of
information.

In Waterfall creativity, systems engineers function to coordinate between specific and
high-level program goals. Formal hierarchies and processes are put in place so as to
facilitate effective communication between the various engineers, managers, personnel,
users, and stakeholders in the development process. Wise program planning, program
managers, and systems engineers work to balance the need for enough variety of
information and enough interchanges between that information. To the degree that
Waterfall methods do not achieve creative criticality, the program will become disorderly
and vulnerable to emergent risk. If, on the other hand, there is too much information
available and too many interactions happening, the design process will become
unmanageably large.
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It is also possible for a single program to implement a combination of Agile and
Waterfall methods, where the program leaders are seeking tradeoffs from each
methodology to meet specific goals. Some areas of a program can be Agile while other
areas are more incremental. It may well be that agility is preferable to traceability, or vice
versa. The informal structure of Agile facilitates divergent thinking but poses the risk of
being limited to smaller systems. Developing large systems may require too much
coordination for less formalized methods to work efficiently. The advantage of Waterfall
creativity is that by making formal techniques to facilitate creativity, it is better suited to
developing large, highly sophisticated systems.

Either way, creativity depends on the interplay between convergent thinking and
divergent thinking. The effective coordination of these thinking modes occurs through
creative tertiary process. In Agile, tertiary process is coincidental and spontaneous,
whereas in Waterfall, tertiary process is the intentional work of systems engineers.

Thus far, we have looked at theory about creativity in aerospace. In the following
chapters, we will move in the direction of practical recommendations, beginning in Chapter
4 with existing methods for facilitating creativity and then proceeding to two novel
methods for doing so in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 4
EXISTING METHODS FOR FACILITATING CREATIVITY

In this chapter, we will take a look into existing recommendations for fostering
creativity in aerospace engineering. Ironically, there is a distinct lack of research on
aerospace creativity even though modern interest in engineering creativity was sparked in
1957 with the shock of Sputnik (Cropley, 2015). Various aspects and strategies for
fostering creativity that appear in the literature are discussed, as briefed in the following
paragraph. Of notable interest is the work of Darold Cummings and the father-son team of
Arthur and David Cropley. The methods presented here bear special relevance in searching
for how to improve the historical Waterfall methodology, even though they are applicable
under a variety of systems engineering strategies.

Creative ideas form as intersection of various pools of information. Creativity involves
a complex dynamic between different states of brain activity. Creativity can be cultivated
by altering the workplace physically and psychologically. Leadership quality and systems
engineering methodology seem to both have an affect on the conditions for creativity.
College education and cognitive training can play into engineers’ creativity, but it is
insufficient. Several methodological tools, such as Model-Based Systems Engineering and
forms of Multidisciplinary Design Optimization, are described in terms of how they affect
creativity. A potential mathematical method for modeling creative logic is described. All
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of these strategies anticipate Chapter 5, in which some formal techniques for addressing
the root cause of creative blockage in large aerospace programs are suggested.

4.1 Overview of Research on Aerospace Creativity

Although there is a great amount of creativity research in general, there is a distinct lack
of research into how creativity relates to engineering (Kazanjian et al., 2000; Cropley,
2015) and especially how it relates to aerospace engineering. Ironically, “much of the
modern interest in creativity in engineering resulted from the ‘Sputnik shock’ that followed
the success of the Soviet Union in launching Sputnik 1 in 1957” (Cropley & Cropley,
1999); yet, inputting various search engines with terms related to aerospace engineering
creativity reveals there is but a handful of papers on creativity and innovation in aerospace.
In other words, modern interest in engineering creativity began in the aerospace industry
and yet aerospace creativity has been an almost untouched topic since then. This lack of
research in aerospace engineering creativity is significant, not only because engineering is
fundamentally a creative process, but also because it is one of the most powerful and
ubiquitous expressions of creativity in human society. David Cropley writes, “the process
of engineering design bears a strong similarity to the more general process of creativity.
However, with regard to engineering, while creativity research has articulated many of the
key psychological cognitive, personal and organizational concepts, features and
characteristics of this process, engineering design has largely ignored these. Instead,
engineering design, and engineering more broadly, has remained defined largely in terms
of key processes of logic, analysis and judgement” (Cropley, 2020). He goes so far to say,
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“In many ways…engineering design is the ultimate expression of creativity. For
thousands of years humankind has depended on its ability to recognize problems,
generate a diverse range of ideas for solving those problems, and the ability to
evaluate and implement these ideas as practical solutions. This would seem to
suggest that humankind, in the process of engineering design, has reached a
pinnacle of creativity” (Ibid.).
Yet,
“The engineering profession remains one that is seen principally in terms of the
application of critical thinking skills, and the laws of nature, to the efficient use of
raw materials. Engineering design is seen more as a matter of reapplying the known,
rather than as a question of exploring the new. Engineering design is a good
representation of creativity, but it is not yet the optimal representation of creativity.
Not only are there weaknesses in parts of the process, in particular the application
of divergent thinking, but there are also opportunities to improve engineering
design by drawing on the considerable body of knowledge available from some 70
years of, largely psychological, creativity research.” (Ibid.).
Insofar as engineering processes are related to creative processes, it is beneficial to
examine how various engineering behaviors, processes, and procedures can facilitate
or hinder individual and group creativity.

Aircraft design consultant Darold Cummings is known for his presentations on
creativity to cadets at the United States Air Force Academy and elsewhere. As an
experienced aerospace engineer and knowledgeable teacher of creativity, his perspective
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is a major voice in the field and represents one of the few that are publicly articulated.
Therefore, it is worthwhile spending some time examining his research. In light of the
many consolidations that have occurred in the aerospace industry, as well as the everincreasing amount of information involved in understanding industry trends, Cummings
and Hall propose that exploiting the creative process can be a way to continue developing
innovative design solutions. “In this emerging environment, individuals and groups are
becoming ‘cubicle entrepreneurs’; that is, developing new concepts in an engineering
microcosm and then marketing them both internally and externally to achieve critical mass.
This new environment has dictated an even greater need for creativity and innovation on a
daily basis” (Cummings & Hall, 2004).

4.2 Meme Pools

Cummings advocates for understanding various cognitive aspects of the creative
process and learning how to implement them. For instance, “the creative insight that
inspires a new or unique pattern” is generated when meme clusters, “bits of information
that form ideas or concepts,” are combined in new ways. “An enriched meme pool (diverse
experience) greatly enhances the ability to create unique patterns.” The meme pool
regarding the domain of aerospace engineering can be enriched by such things as
engineering-related hobbies, personal hobbies, outside culture, and personal development.
These non-domain meme pools can be sources for obtaining relevant skills and hands-on
experience; for facilitating neural growth, stress reduction, and focused attention; for
developing conceptual and intuitive knowledge about how to see design problems from an
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innovative perspective. Practices such as the “Brainernet” can be used to help generate
unusual recombinations of meme clusters in the design process. Brainernet is similar to
brainstorming: it involves an individual or group quickly coming up with many solutions
to a design problem, on the premise that any idea is acceptable regardless of how bizarre
or infeasible it seems (Cummings, 2018-19). This helps get the engineers out of their
typical frame of mind. Conventional thinking is built around conventional designs, and so
only minor, incremental innovations can happen by means of conventional thinking
patterns.

4.3 Brainwave States

Furthermore, creativity can be described physiologically as brainwave states (Table 2),
which can help engineers understand how to pace their workflow to be more conducive to
creativity. Different activity levels in the brain, measured as electrical frequencies,
correspond to different levels of attention. Higher frequency brainwaves correspond to
higher attention activities, while lower frequency brainwaves correspond to sleepier, restful
states. An understanding of some basic relations between these brainwave states affords
valuable insight into engineering creativity.
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Table 2. Characteristics of different brain activity levels. (Cummings & Hall, 2004)
Brainwave State

Frequency

Occurrence

Beta

16-28 Hz

Purposeful activity requiring alertness, such as
planning, argumentation, or athletics.

Alpha

7-16 Hz

Alert relaxation, such as in silent contemplation or
passive sensory awareness.

Theta

4-7 Hz

Falling asleep (hypnagogic state) and waking up
(hypnopompic state), or daydreaming.

Delta

0.5-4 Hz

Sleeping state, in which body recovers from waking
state.

Beta is a high energy state that allows for instantaneous action, reaction,
communication, and judgment. In brainstorming, most people act in a beta state. Due to
beta involving a high degree of attention and focus, it could be said that divergent thinking
in the beta state happens in a convergent and rational manner: beta wave divergent thinking
tends to involve quick critical thinking and is goal-oriented. In this way, convergent and
divergent thinking can condition each other.

Alpha is a more patient state that allows for tranquil reflection and observation of
general patterns and trends. Alpha can be activated in activities like reading a book. In high
quality brainstorming sessions, the alpha state is activated alongside the beta state, allowing
for calm observation to inspire judgments, decisions, and plans. Brainwave states can be
layered and integrated together in diverse ways; this integration is key to creative processes
in general (Lehrer, 2012; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). Convergent thinking in the alpha state
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seems to happen in a nonlinear manner: alpha wave convergent thinking tends to involve
open-ended questions, broad scanning, and intuitive leaps in the attentive periphery.

The theta state, also known as “liminal consciousness,” for being the threshold state
between waking and sleeping, mostly involves divergent thinking. It is open-ended and
spontaneous. The theta and delta states are critical in the incubation and inspiration stages
of creativity. When the brain slips into daydreaming or resting states, or when it rises from
rest, various specified areas of attention are calmed down and brought together in nonlinear
recombinations. In other words, the brain states related to dreaming have a critical role in
enabling the complex cognition that is so characteristic of creativity. Of special
significance is the interaction between beta and alpha. Since extrinsic motivation can close
off awareness of affective states, beta state activity can speed past, overlook, or
misinterpret alpha state activity. Since alpha is a more nonlinear, holistic, quiet state,
overlooking it means inhibiting intuitive reflection.

Appreciating how different brainwave states function in creative cognition can help
engineers understand how to behave more creatively at work. Perhaps going for a walk,
daydreaming, or sleeping on an idea is a better way of solving a tricky design problem than
frustratedly going in circles without making much progress. Focusing too heavily on
deadlines can prevent an engineering organization from integrating brainwave states with
a lower frequency than those in the alert beta state.
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4.4 Effects of Environment on Motivation

It is possible to alter the physical environment of a workplace to facilitate creativity,
such as by removing cubicles, personalizing them, and by providing software with intuitive
user experience (UX) (Lehrer, 2012; Levi, 2017; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Catmull, 2014).
“It is paradoxical that engineers are asked to think out of the box while spending most of
their time confined to a very banal box!” (Cummings & Hall, 2004). In 2014, Northrop
Grumman opened up their “FabLab,” short for Fabrication Lab, at their Space Park facility
in Los Angeles. FabLab is a 5,500 sq-ft. facility to give employees “hands-on access to a
range of tools, equipment and materials, and the freedom to turn their ideas into reality”
(Defense & Aerospace Week, 2014).

Analogously, it is possible to alter the psychological environment of a workplace to
facilitate creativity, such as by fostering a culture of tolerance toward ambiguity. It should
be noted that it is much more difficult to change the culture of a workplace to facilitate
creativity than it is to change the physical environmental, and that many of conventional
practices in aerospace programs actually work to hinder the creative process. “In the
Advanced Design arena, considered the creative front of the aerospace industry, the
psychological environment can best be described as routine chaos. Budgets can fluctuate
rapidly, and projects which often appear solid sublimate right in front of astonished
engineers. The ability to function with a high level of energy and enthusiasm in an
ambiguous environment truly sets people apart.” (Cummings & Hall, 2004). The “routine
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chaos” of many aerospace programs makes it difficult to implement major changes to
systems engineering methodologies that facilitate creativity, since conventional workflows
evolved in tandem with aerospace programs. To some extent, it is the responsibility of
individuals to bring enthusiasm to the workplace, to act with intrinsic motivation in the
face of uncertainty and ambiguity. “The environment within a large company is often not
well suited to radical changes, yet radical change is required to develop successful products
in a rapidly changing geopolitical world. James Albaugh, President and CEO of Boeing
IDS, in a speech in 2002 said, ‘It is hard for big organizations – be they military or corporate
– to embrace change. Mass – we know from physics – is the measure of inertia.’ Most
‘Cubicle Entrepreneurs’ succeed in large companies despite the system of entrenched
checks and balances, and the panoply procedures.” (Ibid.) Innovation depends on creativity
and yet engineering processes tend to inhibit creativity by requiring formality and
negatively rewarding divergent thinking. Even so, creativity can still occur. Structure and
constraint can be a catalyst or growth point creativity, just as it can snuff it out (Sandwith
et al., 2017; Catmull, 2014; Cummings & Hall, 2004).

Groups can be organized to facilitate intrinsic motivation. This includes forming teams
with an optimal balance of heterogeneity and homogeneity: new and experienced
engineers, engineers of different disciplines, engineers with different personalities,
engineers with different backgrounds, etc. (Lehrer, 2012). Forming cross-functional teams
may prevent the inhibition of creativity that arises in the confusion of cross-team
interactions; and in cross-team interactions in large programs, focusing on failures and
crises may make it easier to foster the creative process (Kazanjian et al., 2000).
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As stated earlier, facilitating the necessary motivation for engineering creativity is
specific to a workplace. Young summarizes some of the major promoters and inhibitors of
creativity in aircraft design, shown in Table 3.

Table 3. Factors for promoting and creativity in aircraft design. (Young, 2007)
Creativity Promotors

Creativity Inhibitors

Adversity

Limitations of computer simulation tools

Observation and curiosity

Absence of a creative environment

Races, contests, and inducement prizes

Fear of failure

Targets and grand challenges

Unwarranted or unsubstantiated criticism

Collaboration and concurrent engineering

Poor definition of success

Information technology, analysis tools,
and knowledge base

Essentially, “…each stage of engineering design, to be optimized, requires the right set of
individual dispositions and qualities, coupled with the right environmental conditions for
the particular convergent or divergent stage in question. If any of these three are misaligned
– for example, an unmotivated, closed individual in a divergent process, or, a highly
motivated, highly divergent team, with no time or resources to generate ideas – then
engineering design, and creativity, will be blocked.” (Cropley, 2020).
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4.5 Leadership Style and Systems Engineering

There is disagreement over the extent to which creativity is determined by culture or
methodology. Some swear by wise leadership and employee self-actualization, other swear
by systems engineering. There is ambiguity over whether leadership style drives culture or
methods drive culture, both in the creativity literature and in engineering practice. They
likely feed into each other, and creativity can be facilitated both ways. Someone like Kelly
Johnson can lead many successful programs without making major changes to
conventional workflows. A program can lack systems engineering practices and still be
well-ordered and successful. Yet, to leave implicit the capacity to facilitate creativity and
develop complex systems has the consequence that those informal, intuitive methods
cannot be generalized and repeated when such leadership is absent. Systems engineering
can formalize the best practices of effective leadership. Moreover, on especially large
programs, the acumen of an exceptional leader is harder to access, and so a plurality of
leaders can be coordinated through something like systems engineering. This is no excuse
for poor leadership but can help toward ensuring that an organization can be consistently
successful in creating systems. As for what sorts of small practices are known to assist in
facilitating engineering creativity, here is a brief list:
•

Individuals should be given independent free time so that they can perform
intuitive, nonlinear processes such as insight, incubation, and illumination.

•

Groups should engage in free-flowing exchanges of ideas. Groups should
collectively speculate, imagine, and critique their progress together, so as to
facilitate project-wide intrinsic motivation.
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•

Individuals should not be rewarded negatively during postmortems.

•

Imaginative activities should be performed, like premortems, root cause analyses,
and preliminary syntheses of user and stakeholder needs. (Catmull, 2014; Lehrer,
2012; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Clearfield & Tilczik, 2018; Cropley & Cropley,
1999)

Cropley and Cropley recommend how to foster creativity at particular stages of the
engineering process: “It is possible to state areas in the synthesis process where
management functions should be employed to specifically foster the skills (both cognitive
and non-cognitive) needed to ensure success. Some of these have already been suggested.
They may be summarized as follows:
(a) Preliminary synthesis activities of engineers must seek to generate a wide and
varied body of latent knowledge to feed the creative aspects of the synthesis
process. Engineers must be given the means and opportunity to build this latent
knowledge.
(b) Professional knowledge and ability contribute vitally to creativity. Engineers must
build specialist knowledge on a continuing basis to feed creativity.
(c) Engineers must be made aware of cognitive skills. They must be trained in
divergent thinking techniques. These may span a variety of ‘creativity
techniques’.
(d) Engineers must be able to apply these cognitive skills in a supportive,
extrinsically rewarding environment. They must feel comfortable thinking
divergently, and being seen to think divergently, at the appropriate time.
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(e) Engineers must develop tolerance for ambiguity, openness and other similar noncognitive characteristics.
(f) The system in which they work must support the feelings which drive many of the
creativity phases. Thus the engineer’s pride, excitement, curiosity, etc. must be
nurtured at the appropriate phase of creativity.” (Cropley & Cropley, 1999)

4.6 Engineering Education and Cognitive Training

Creativity can be facilitated in engineering through engineering college curricula that
encourage ingenuity and collaboration and on-site cognitive training. Much of engineering
education is structured to produce specialists with a conservative attitude toward novelty
and has an absence of hands-on experience. Generalized, interdisciplinary coursework is
often not permitted, setting up engineering students to not explore their interests and,
consequently, to neglect divergent thinking. As John McMasters and Russell Cummings
point out, “system talent (especially those who serve as system architects) is relatively rare
in the general engineering population and special care is needed to cultivate and develop it
in student and apprentice-level engineers” (McMasters et al., 2004). Open-ended design
problems with hands-on collaborative experience are atypical for many engineering college
programs. David Cropley’s copiously cited “Promoting Creativity and Innovation in
Engineering Education” is a superb essay on how to develop a creative engineering
curriculum. He cites Sternberg’s three main principles for promoting creativity: “First,
students must have the opportunity to engage in creativity. This must be woven,
holistically, throughout programs and courses in an integrated and mutually reinforcing
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manner. Second, students must receive positive encouragement as they engage in tasks
requiring creativity. Third, students must be rewarded when they demonstrate the desired
creativity” (Cropley, 2015).

Creativity can arise as personality trait, a learned behavior, a social tendency, and an
environmental condition (Cropley, 2015). Thus, it can be taught and cultivated, albeit when
attempts are driven by a reductive intent (Cropley & Cropley, 2000). Simply having
occasional trainings or working sessions for engineers to consider problems from different
perspectives, to problem-solve creatively, to reflect on their tasks with philosophical
abstraction, to focus on user and stakeholders offers some potential for benefitting
engineers, and to reflect on the effectiveness of their procedures is potentially beneficial
for engineers.

4.7 Methodological Tools

Tools already exist for evaluating the creativity of engineering products, such as the
Decision Tree for Originality Assessment in Design (DTOAD) (Kershaw et al., 2019), but
these do not directly serve the goal of improving complexity management strategies. An
organization’s capacity to be creative is a more important metric for evaluating if they can
manage complexity than the originality of a system. Cropley and Cropley’s Innovation
Phase Assessment Instrument (IPAI) questionnaire evaluates roughly how aligned various
areas of an engineering organization are with the ideal conditions for creativity (Cropley,
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2015). The IPAI gives a means of comparing where, relatively, creativity is more or less
prevalent.

There are numerous methodological tools for complex systems engineering, and in so
doing foster the information coordination required for Waterfall creativity. According to
INCOSE, Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) is “the formalized application of
modeling to support system requirements, design, analysis, verification, and validation
activities beginning in the conceptual design phase and continuing throughout development
and later life cycle phases” (INCOSE, 2007). By making it easier for engineers to
understand the state of the program and communicate with each other, there will be fewer
external constraints, such as regularly checking specifications and tracking changes, that
tend to yield creativity-inhibiting extrinsic motivation. Multidisciplinary Design
Optimization (MDO) also facilitates creative information coordination by synthesizing the
trade studies of different disciplines in one platform (Wang et al., 2014). Similarly, the upand-coming field of Uncertainty-Based Multidisciplinary Design Optimization (UMDO)
is “an advanced methodology to address competing objectives of aerospace vehicle design,
such as performance, reliability, and robustness” as pertaining to the uncertainties of
various system aspects (Yao et al., 2011). Like MDO, UMDO fosters creative information
coordination, except through the explicit investigation of subjective complexity in a
systematic and comprehensive manner. This is by no means an exhaustive representation
of methodological tools that will assist in facilitating engineering creativity; these examples
are selected to relate how such tools affect creativity. Future work in methodological
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systems engineering tools will help complex aerospace system development by enhancing
the information accessibility needed for project-wide engineering creativity.

4.8 Mathematics for Creativity

The Honing Theory mentioned in Section 3.2 offers math for how to represent creative
recombinations of information. Modeling creative recombination cannot be a process of
linear superposition, since it is typically the case that creativity puts different ideas together
in a way that results in emergent properties distinct from the properties of the component
ideas, i.e., because creativity is a complex process. To deal with the complex,
noncompositional nature of creative processing, HT proposes a quantum model would
function. This “quantum model” has nothing to do with the phenomena of quantum
mechanics, except for its logical operations. The noncompositional, probabilistic,
potentiality-focused logic of quantum mechanics lends itself to describing the complex
operations of creativity.

The potential of creative ideas can be represented as state vectors in Hilbert spaces, and
the combinations between different states under different conditions yields different
potentials for usefulness. The potential of a creative idea can be represented as follows:
𝒑 = 𝑎0 𝒖 + 𝑎1 𝒘
where p is a measure of the idea’s potential, 𝒖 and 𝒘 are orthogonal unit vectors denoting
the usefulness or wastefulness of an idea, and amplitudes 𝑎0 and 𝑎1 are complex numbers
that represent the probability of those two states. By representing the probability of
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usefulness with complex numbers rather than real numbers, nonlinear associations between
different states, such as superposition, interference, and entanglement, can be composed
together in a linear fashion.

Now, the potential of a creative concept varies depending on conditions. For instance,
a different user might envision a different use case, or a different environment might make
the same user deem the product ineffective. Thus, there is also a need for: “(1) its set of
states Σ… (2) a set L of relevant properties, (3) a set M of contexts in which the concept
may be relevant, (4) a function v that gives the applicability or weight of a certain property
for a particular state and context, and (5) a function μ that gives the probability of transition
from one state to another under the influence of a particular context” (Gabora, 2017).
Depending on the state and context, the creative idea has different valuations of its
potential, corresponding to members of the sets and vectors given above. The vector basis
of the creative idea is an eigenstate to all the particular conditions and contexts it can
operate in. When one use-state is selected, the vector is projected into that Hilbert space.
Although this could happen in a simple fashion, where there is a deterministic result to
each state, it may be the case that there are several states, relevant properties, and contexts
at work simultaneously.

There is also the function-first nature of creative products to account for (Sandwith et
al., 2017), i.e., that different systems can satisfy the same use, as well as the possibility of
more than one potential use-state happening in one context simultaneously. To deal with
this, the Hilbert space operators can be arranged as projections of state vectors onto each
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other, with different dimensions corresponding to use-states. So long as each state vector
is divided by its length, the potential usefulness of each state can be linearly added as a
series of unit vectors. The dissipation of psychological entropy can be seen as how aligned
the state vectors are with each other in the dimension of usefulness. Again, the HT
mathematical method for representing creative recombination is not a way to evaluate the
conditions for creativity; it is a way of expressing the complex nature of creative
recombination.

There has not been a large amount of research done on engineering creativity, and much
less on aerospace engineering creativity. Existing research in the field tends to concentrate
on broad motivational factors or prospective areas for future work. The Agile community
has done most in the area of bridging between motivational factors and systems engineering
methods. However, is a lack of research on how Waterfall methods can be altered to
facilitate creative motivation. Given that vertical hierarchy is important in complex
aerospace systems engineering, such methods could be valuable.
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Chapter 5
NEW METHODS FOR FACILITATING CREATIVITY

In Chapter 4, various existing engineering strategies were considered with regard to
how they facilitate engineering creativity. In this chapter, two new strategies are proposed
for using creativity as a way of addressing the paradigmatic challenge of complexity in
aerospace. The first strategy is the formation of a new systems engineering group that
performs divergent thinking and tertiary processing in an analogous manner to creative
thinking in an individual. The second is a conceptual model for how to model tertiary
processes throughout a development program to anticipate complexity earlier than is
otherwise knowable. These strategies were developed with Waterfall in view.

5.1 Parallel Systems Engineering

“…To fully exploit [the elements of the creative process] they must be focused into
techniques that provide free-thinking and successful problem solving” (Cummings & Hall,
2004). It would be helpful to systems engineering to scale up the creative interplay between
convergent and divergent thinking, between reasoning and intuition, to a procedural level.
This would help adapt the Waterfall methodology for complex design domains.
Conventional systems engineering, as it stands, performs both convergent and divergent
thinking, coordinating the various organizational disciplines, divisions, groups, and teams,
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as well as coordinating between program-level goals and individual work packages. It is
necessary for systems engineers to perform the ideation, broad scanning, and associating
of divergent thinking as well as the analysis, synthesis, and evaluation of convergent
thinking. Systems engineers observe the program as a whole and in its components,
intuitively make best judgments and connect various threads of information together,
reason through the objectives of the program and develop formal processes and metrics for
staying on track with system-level requirements. Although systems engineering has
evolved in tandem with aerospace technology, conventional methods tend to fall short
when it comes to complex system development. For large, high-stakes programs, the
external expectations placed on systems engineers and placed on others by systems
engineers can become a source of extrinsic motivation, making the creative interplay
between reasoning and intuition difficult to manage. These external constraints are not bad,
per se, because they are important means of effectively organizing a program and
maintaining its productivity. However, in the context of complex system development, the
need for linear organization and the need to follow a nonlinear process toward complexity
are in conflict.

To account for this, it is possible to adopt the Agile approach to creativity: loosening
procedures and flattening hierarchy so as to facilitate more intuitive, divergent thinking.
However, this means that there is less regulation embedded in a program, making it more
difficult to develop large, complex systems. On the other hand, it is possible to hold to the
Waterfall approach to creativity, seeking formal techniques for facilitating creative
motivation. This can be accomplished by forming a systems engineering group that
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performs the tasks that intuition and tertiary processing would in an individual’s creative
process. The conventional systems engineering group remains in their current capacity.
However, instead of having to try and wrangle divergent processes away from the extrinsic
motivation of a linearly organized program, such an ancillary group would complement
conventional systems engineering groups by performing tasks that require a higher degree
of openness to intuitive cognitive states than is practical for other engineers. They would
perform tasks which tend to occur in parallel with the critical path, concurrently rather than
incrementally, and yet are vital to complex system development. For this reason, they could
be called a Parallel Systems Engineering group (PASE), not to be confused with the
similarly oriented Program Systems Engineering (PSE) (Pfarr et al., 2009).

PASEs would not interface with the customer or perform tasks on the critical path, but
would instead have a great deal of autonomy, acting as assistance to various engineers in
connecting the dots of uncertainty, tying up loose ends, performing those tasks which are
so divergent as to be impractical for other engineers and yet are important, and actively
reflecting on how engineering complexity is affecting a design process. As systems
engineers, they would coordinate between broader objectives and smaller work packages,
but in a way that reports “downward,” i.e., they are responsible to individual engineers
rather than to upper management. This would free them from extrinsic motivation, since
their constraints would not be determined by formalities but by the complex needs of the
program. Their responsibility is to the program and to the engineers they are serving.
Moreover, PASEs would function similarly to intuition in associating and recombining
information, and to tertiary processing, in that they would be able to coordinate between
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specified and generalized tasks. In filling the missing role for divergent thinking and
tertiary integration, openness and variety of information would be increased on an
organizational-level scale, facilitating the creative process.

PASEs would not be a substitute for other engineers to engage in holistic or creative
behavior. That would set up opposition between one small working group, which is
supposedly “nonlinear and creative,” and all the other engineers who are, in comparison,
“linear and uncreative.” It is unlikely such a scheme would lead to constructive
collaboration, much less to improvements in complexity management. Moreover,
instituting a PASE group by no means is to say that engineers are uncreative and opposed
to nonlinearity. In many regards, aerospace engineers already see, appreciate, and
understand the nonlinear aspects of engineering, as well as how to be creative. The fact
that aircraft and spacecraft can function at all is a testament to the skillful communication
and coordination between the engineers who designed them. However, there is a tendency
for engineering processes to be noticeably reductive in complex domains. Providing clearer
guidelines and more effective methods for catching problems associated with complexity
would attend to this need. PASEs would function as a check-and-balance on
organizational-level creativity in complex aerospace system development. Furthermore,
PASEs would not substitute the existing work of systems engineers. PASEs act as an
ancillary check on the areas where conventional systems engineering is prevented by
practical demands from accessing more divergent processes. They have a complementary
role of stepping outside the conventional process into a parallel process, in order to check
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on the flow of information, especially between components and across layers of system
hierarchy.

In an individual’s creative process, there are distinct roles that reasoning, intuition, and
tertiary processing play. Yet, in systems engineering, the are blended together. Forming a
PASE group would protect the openness needed for creativity under a Waterfall
methodology. In doing so, the problems of complexity and emergent risk are addressed
directly, systematically, and practically – all while making hardly any changes to the
conventional workflow of aerospace programs.

Although Parallel Systems Engineering is a novel concept derived from the nature of
creativity, it was discovered later that a similar goal has been suggested in a study of NOAA
and NASA’s $7-billion Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites (GOES-R)
program. In GOES-R, a Program Systems Engineering team (PSE) was formed, consisting
of about twenty people belonging to one of three tiers: “systems leadership, an
intermediary, or ‘middle’ tier of developing systems professionals with functional
backgrounds, and functional experts” (Pfarr et al., 2009). The PSE was studied with regard
to how it affects collaborative systems thinking for the entire program, i.e., how well it
facilitated creative thinking. Since the middle tier systems engineers “act as an interface
between the functional experts and the systems leadership,” they became a locus of major
problems related to:
1. Insufficient breadth of experience;
2. Common understanding of holistic system;
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3. Unified PSE team culture;
4. Integrating goals of middle tier with those of technical experts.
Some of the proposed solutions to these middle tier problems include:
•

“Using the senior systems engineer who has [breadth of] experience as a mentor
and consultant, providing resources (books, online databases, other engineers at
Goddard) so that the engineers get the data they lack, and to allow more time for
tasks so that this data gathering process can happen.” (Ibid.)

•

“On the job training including rotational assignments, a curriculum of technical
courses, and systems leadership training.” (Ibid.)

•

“Establish focus groups within the Engineering Directorate. These are small groups
of 4 – 7 systems engineers working on areas with a common theme. For example,
we can create a focus group for the Earth Science ground system engineering and
a focus group for spacecraft systems engineering, etc. The primary purpose of these
focus groups is to improve the systems engineering capabilities through knowledge
sharing and problem solving among the group members. Additionally, they provide
a measurement and feedback on how well the systems engineering processes were
being applied on the various projects. They are non-confrontational assessments of
the issues, successes and the challenges that were being faced each day by the
systems engineers in the field. It may also be an excellent way to monitor the inner
workings of the systems engineering processes without a formal assessment. People
tend to be nervous about formal surveys and assessments and they will often hold
back information or exaggerate performance under the scrutiny of such formality.
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On the other hand, focus groups are less formal and less confrontational and
engineers are more willing to open up on what the real issues are.” (Ibid.)
Notwithstanding mentoring and training, introducing a Parallel Systems Engineering group
would most likely fulfill many of these aims. PASEs would have additional space, time,
and resources to obtain the needed breadth of knowledge. They would work toward
common understanding of the holistic system, since their explicit goal is to focus on
connecting various elements of a program. They would be non-confrontational, since they
act to serve the needs of working level engineers rather than reporting to systems
leadership. A PASE group would also prevent informal focus groups from being
marginalized from formal scheduling. By being free from the critical path, PASEs function
as a check on program-level intuition and tertiary processing. Figure 9 shows how PASE
might fit into an organizational chart.

Figure 9. Parallel systems engineering in an organizational chart. (Drake, 2018-19)
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5.2 Modeling Complexity in Intermediate Creative Processes

As mentioned in Chapter 3, the engineering development process consists of
intermediate creative processes with intermediate products along the way. This can be
understood to follow the chronological sequence of traditional design workflows or a
logical sequence between various kinds of tasks. Chronologically, development might be
decomposed as follows: user needs are formulated into requirements, requirements are
translated into a conceptual design, a conceptual design is refined into a preliminary design,
a preliminary design is refined into a detail design, then detail design is manufactured into
the end product. Logically, development might be decomposed as: user needs are
formulated into requirements, requirements are translated into a program plan, a program
plan is translated into an organization, an organization is used to design the system, the
design is used to make manufacturing plans, manufacturing plans are used to make the end
product. Either way, the entire engineering development process can be understood as a
series of interdependent, intermediate creative processes.

In each of the intermediate processes, the output product derives from the previous
intermediate system. In a more simplified sense, the progression from user needs to
requirements is a sort of inverse process to the progression from design methodology to
design. The formulation of requirements begins with psychological entropy, a need for a
system and ends with creating formal requirements for measuring system performance.
The design methodology begins with those requirements and tries to create something that
fulfills the user needs. Each of these are creative processes, and ideally, they form a closed
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loop, such that the user need corresponds to the requirements, and the requirements
correspond to the end product. This idea is depicted in Figure 10, following the color code
given earlier in Figure 4.

Figure 10. Intermediate creative processes of aerospace system development.

Since creativity integrates linear and nonlinear information in a tertiary process, then by
modeling the creative process, complexity can become traceable. In engineering, tertiary
processes would primarily appear in the development of an intermediate system. For
instance, the complexity of a design could be anticipated by modeling the design process,
or the complexity of an organization could be anticipated by modeling the management
process. In general, modeling an intermediate creative process provides a mechanism for
representing tertiary process information, making it possible to directly address many
forms of engineering complexity. A central database, such as an MBSE platform, could be
used to observe the flow of information and search for areas of tight coupling. This could
provide a means of observing correlations between objective and subjective complexity
across phases of a program. It could even be possible to study how complexity propagates
through any of the intermediate creative processes, and to thereby evaluate whether or not
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an intermediate process has requisite variety for the intermediate product it is developing.
This may make it possible to anticipate emergent risk well before synthesis, verification
and validation, and in earlier program phases. The ability to anticipate areas of emergent
risk would represent a major advantage in systems engineering.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSION

The present challenge of complex aerospace system development requires a paradigm
shift in systems engineering methods. Mounting evidence of large aerospace programs
exceeding their budgets and schedules suggests that conventional systems engineering
methods lack sufficient control over the complex systems they are implemented to develop.
Although it is important to address the technical challenges of developing objectively
complex systems, it is also important to address the subjective complexity of developing
objectively complex systems. To successfully manage complexity, systems engineering
processes can adopt nonlinear processes that are appropriate for complex design domains.
Creativity is a tertiary process that integrates linear and nonlinear thinking in a way that
produces meaningful order. Thus, fostering creativity through systems engineering can be
used as a complexity management strategy. Not only that, engineering is fundamentally a
creative activity, and therefore applying the findings of creativity research to aerospace
systems engineering has potential for improving complexity management strategies in
general.

There has been a limited amount of research on creativity in aerospace, which means
that this topic has unexplored potential in the aerospace industry. Future methods for
fostering creativity in aerospace programs could consist of the strategies recommended in
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the literature review of Chapter 4. In addition to cataloging these methods, this thesis
provides two novel methods for reducing emergent risk in complex system development.
These methods were developed by comparing creativity research, complexity theory, and
aerospace systems engineering. Strategies were sought for how to adapt the Waterfall
methodology for large, complex aerospace systems.

The two methods presented in Chapter 5 represent the culmination of this work. First, a
Parallel Systems Engineering group can be added to existing organizational hierarchies to
compensate for the limitations of conventional systems engineering methods. Parallel
Systems Engineers could perform divergent thinking and tertiary processing on a programwide level, focusing on areas of complexity, as support for the working engineers. This
could help facilitate the creative process for the whole program. Second, the flow of
information through intermediate creative processes in a development program can be
modeled. By tracking the flow of information in a central database, like MBSE, and
observing areas of tight coupling, the propagation of complexity throughout a program
could be modelled. This could provide a means for predicting areas that are likely to have
emergent risk well before synthesis, verification, and validation. Facilitating creativity
through systems engineering methods such as these could make complex aerospace
development programs cheaper and more efficient.
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APPENDICES
A. ALTERNATIVE REPRESENTATIONS OF THE ENGINEERING CREATIVE
PROCESS

There are several other well-known models of the standard engineering process. There
is the “Analysis, Synthesis, Evaluation” model, which is better understood as a simple
representation of engineering tasks in general than an outline of the entire engineering
process. Analysis glosses over identifying user needs, deriving requirements, trade studies,
and the actual designing of subsystems, components, subcomponents, etc. Synthesis
likewise glosses over many steps of combining information in the engineering process, like
configuration development, crosstalk between engineers about integration, and testing.
Note that “in most systems engineering projects the most difficult phase is the system
synthesis rather than the analysis. Systems synthesis requires the greatest ingenuity in
finding promising new concepts and will ordinarily require both technological inventions
as well as organizational innovations. This system synthesis phase also requires the use of
judgment and good sense, so as to achieve a system which represents a major advance but
is not hopelessly difficult or unreasonably expensive and time consuming to develop”
(Cropley & Cropley, 1999). Evaluation also includes all forms of double-checking
throughout the process. It is impractical to try to fit it into the six-stage creative sequence.

There is also is the “Engineering V,” where the first section of the engineering process
that consists of designing the whole system down to the smallest level of detail is
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represented by the left side of the “V,” and the second section of the engineering process
consisting of integrating the designs for the sub-levels, verification and validation, making
modifications as necessary, combining levels of system hierarchy, all building up to a
completed system design is represented by the right side of the V. This model does fit well
with the six-stage creativity sequence. The left half of the V matches with the first four
creative phases: problem finding, preparation, incubation, and illumination. Then, the
system is evaluated and implemented, which corresponds to the right side of the V. Of
course, the creative phases recur whenever there is rework to be done. These models are
abstractions, intended to illustrate ways in which the creative process can map onto the
engineering process. It is not necessary for there to be one-to-one correspondence to glean
valuable information from the comparison.

The Technology Readiness Level (TRL) flowchart (see Table 4) does have a loose
correlation with the creative process, in that lower TRLs indicate a concept that is
developing, middle TRLs indicate a concept that has been formed and yet to be fully
verified and implemented, and higher TRLs indicate a concept that is in implementation.
Beyond this, the similarity is not rigorous. Yes, the problem of complex system
development can be reframed in terms of being inventive enough to make advanced
technology. Cultivating creativity in engineering would allow for greater access of
advanced design spaces. So, in one sense, if complexity is associated with advanced
technology, it is reasonable to think that enhancing engineering creativity would make
challenging programs more feasible. However, as stated previously, the intent here is not
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to advocate for innovative technology but rather the behavioral process undergirding
aerospace engineering in general.

Table 4. TRL definitions (Young, 2007)
TRL Definition
1

Basic principles observed and reported

2

Technology concept and/or application formulated

3

Analytical and experimental critical function and/pr characteristic proof of concept

4

Component and/or breadboard validation in laboratory environment

5

Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant environment

6

System/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a relevant environment

7

System prototype demonstration in an operational environment

8

Actual system completed and qualified through test and demonstration

9

Actual system proven through successful mission operations
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